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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN
HIGHEST STATE COURTS
PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
I
INTRODUCTION
These are troubled times for constitutional democracy in America.  Among
our political institutions, none are more troubled than many of our highest
state courts.
It was widely foretold that our Republic, like all its predecessors, would be
torn apart by mistrust and unrestrained political rivalry dismembering its insti-
tutions.1  There were times past when this seemed to be happening and yet did
not.  So here we are, two centuries and more later, still a constitutional democ-
racy.  For a century, we have fought wars in its name and have propagated the
idea in a hundred countries.  As I write, our government is actively engaged in
promoting democracy in Malaysia and Iraq.2
It is curious that such a moment of success would also be a time for bitter
recrimination among our political leaders.  Especially so, given that the sub-
stance of the issues dividing us seem relatively inconsequential compared to
those on the public agenda in earlier times when mistrust and incivility were
high, when bitterness could be explained as a reaction to external threats, se-
vere economic conditions, or slavery and its vestiges.  How do we account for
the ugliness presently besetting our politics?
It is possible that our present troubles are chiefly caused by forces too
deeply set in the culture to be usefully addressed by legal or political means.
Thus, it seems likely that some part of the elevation of mistrust is caused by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, an event depriving us of a compelling reason to
trust one another.3  It also seems likely that the demise of the family is a con-
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1. See generally GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978).
2. See George Washington Rides Again, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 2.
3. Montesquieu explained the causes of the corruption of a democratic people thus:
Great success, especially when chiefly owing to the people swells them so high with pride that
it is impossible to manage them.  Jealous of their magistrates they soon become jealous like-
wise of the magistracy; enemies to those that govern, enemies they soon prove to the consti-
CARRINGTON.FMT 04/01/99  4:59 PM
80 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 3
tributing cause, for it is associated with self-absorption seemingly infecting all
our relationships, including our politics.  Lawyers and judges cannot do much
about such deep causes but need to have them in mind as part of the landscape
of the mistrust problem we now face.
Public trust and acceptance of the deployment of government’s power are
the proper concern of all but are a special concern of courts and judges.  At
some point, lawyer jokes become a serious matter.4  Courts and judges are the
bulwark against the disintegration of the mutual trust sustaining the life of
democratic government.  They are our “last best hope” that the Republic will
not be overrun by the greed, mendacity, brutality, moral arrogance, prejudice,
and petty hatreds, that is, the inescapable stuff of the dark side of human na-
ture, that are on display in every courtroom every day.  To fulfill that hope re-
quires our judges to be independent.  They must not be vulnerable to bribery or
intimidation that would corrupt or distort their judgment on issues of law.
They must not only be independent, but they must also be seen to be so.
At the same time, courts, to merit their independence, must be faithful to
democratic law; they must obey the law as made by legislative bodies or set
forth in reasonably explicit provisions of constitutions ratified by a democratic
process.  Because judges in trial and intermediate courts are accountable to
highest courts, it is the latter that are responsible for keeping the faith with
democratic traditions.  Accordingly, this article attends almost entirely to the
issues of the highest courts’ independence and accountability.
Many highest state courts are institutions at risk of being engulfed in mis-
trust.5  Some of the major events marking the decline in civility and mutual
trust are aspects of judicial politics, such as the Bork and Thomas confirmation
proceedings.  The sustained assault on the presidency of Bill Clinton that began
the day of his election in 1992 was, it seems, initially animated in part by the
purpose of preventing him from appointing Supreme Court Justices who would
reaffirm Roe v. Wade.6  Similar local crises of judicial politics can be found in
most states.  To some extent, the crises may have been caused by the failure of
some of the highest state courts to keep faith with democratic traditions.  We
have experienced an age of judicial heroism; during that time, judges were en-
couraged to exercise their powers in disregard of legislative prerogatives.  As a
consequence, many high courts are highly visible objects of political interest
and concern.
                                                          
tution.  Thus it was the victory of Salamine over the Persians that corrupted the republic of
Athens, and thus the defeat of the Athenians ruined the republic of Syracuse.
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. VIII, ch. 4 (Thomas Nugent trans., J. Nourse ed.,
1750) (1748).  This might also explain why personal and political attacks on judges have become com-
mon in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.  See Michael Kirby, Attacks on Judges: A
Universal Phenomenon, 81 JUDICATURE 238 (1998).
4. See Marc Galanter, The Face of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and
Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contempo-
rary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).
5. See Court Evaluation Surveys, 82 JUDICATURE 60 (1998).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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This has happened at the same time that our politics have been transmogri-
fied by the media.  The political advertisement inserted into commercial televi-
sion reaches large audiences of persons who are not seeking political informa-
tion and are in an uncritical frame of mind.  If well done with art, music, and a
voice sounding a little like Walter Cronkite, the advertised message “melts
down” so that the viewer assimilates disinformation without being aware of its
source.  This medium is very expensive as well as potentially very effective.  It
has multiplied the cost of campaigning and made defamation a central feature
of the activity.  These consequences are threatening enough in their impact on
other institutions, but they are potentially deadly to the dignity of highest state
courts.  Especially so in a time of widespread popular mistrust.  The goal of this
article is to confront the risks and consider the available means of reducing
them.
II
THE MISFORTUNE OF ROSE BIRD
It is tempting to many citizens of eastern states to believe that most forms
of moral degradation besetting our Republic germinate in the otherwise over-
privileged state of California.  In this case it is true; the current epidemic of dis-
trust of state court judiciaries has spread eastward from a source on the pali-
sades.  Rose Elizabeth Bird, sometime Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
California, is the leading figure in the series of events threatening ruin for many
of our highest state courts.  The story of her ruin has therefore become a tale of
national import.  It must be said that the wounds suffered by her court were in
a significant measure self-inflicted.
Bird was appointed by Governor Jerry Brown in 1977 as the first woman to
serve on her court.  Before appointing Bird, Brown had publicly expressed
Populist disdain for the state’s judiciary.  He had opposed the judges’ pay raise
and even refused to fill judicial vacancies.7  Her appointment was taken by
many to be a further expression of the Governor’s contempt for the law and the
courts.
For a high court judge, Bird was youthful and inexperienced.  She was 40
years old and had entered the profession only twelve years before her appoint-
ment to the highest legal office in the state.  Her professional experience con-
sisted mainly of work as a public defender.  Her most notable professional role
had been her service for two years as administrator of the California Agricul-
ture and Services Agency8 where she had won notice by her successful effort to
secure legislation protective of the interests of migrant farm laborers.9
                                                          
7. See BETTY MEDSGER, FRAMED: THE NEW RIGHT ATTACK ON CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE BIRD
AND THE COURTS 7-8 (1983).
8. See PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 43-44, 84-87 (1981).
9. See Alatorre-Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1140 (West 1989).
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There was resistance to Bird’s confirmation by the Commission on Judicial
Appointments, some of it petty, some political, some on the ground that she
was reportedly unstable and vindictive10 and, therefore, especially unsuited to
an office responsible for the administration of the largest judiciary in America.
She was nevertheless confirmed by that body on a 2-1 vote.  Pursuant to the
California constitution, she was, along with other recently appointed members
of her court, required to stand for retention by the voters in the 1978 general
election.
Bird became the first Justice sitting on her court since the institution of the
retention election in 1934 to evoke opposition.11  Because her administrative
style as chief of the judicial branch was aggressive and intrusive, and perhaps
disrespectful of old hands and older and possibly wiser heads, she attracted ac-
tive, if subdued, opposition from many members of the state judiciary and
members of the court’s large administrative staff.12
But the larger cause of opposition to Bird was rooted in ideology.  A con-
servative state senator raised a campaign fund, much of it from the gun owners’
lobby, to challenge her moral fitness as a judge, alleging that she was soft on
crime.  He deployed electronic media to make a scurrilous and untruthful per-
sonal attack on her of the sort that has become a signature of contemporary
American politics.  His media blitzkrieg called attention to her share in the re-
sponsibility for her court’s holding that repeated, forced insertions of a penis
into the mouth of a female rape victim does not constitute a crime entailing
“great bodily injury,” as the jury in a celebrated case had been instructed.13
Bird’s separate concurring opinion had emphasized what she denoted as the
“plain meaning” of the controlling statute, which she perceived, not unrea-
sonably, to enhance punishment only when a crime victim experienced endur-
ing physical disability.  One of the television ads prepared at the direction of
her assailant portrayed an apparent rape victim and suggested that her rapist
would soon be on the streets again if Bird were retained as Chief Justice.14
Lawyers supporting Bird advised California television stations that the ad
was misleading and urged that the stations had a legal duty to refuse it or to
provide them with equal free time for a response.  Most thereafter refused to
take the ad, and their refusal marked the end of the gun lobby campaign
against her.15  While others, notably a “No On Bird” organization, continued to
oppose her, they had scant financial resources and did not use electronic me-
dia.16
                                                          
10. See STOLZ, supra note 8, at 87-93.
11. See id. at 58.
12. See MEDSGER, supra note 7, at 69-75.
13. See People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1978).  Details of the case are described by STOLZ,
supra note 8, at 19-28.
14. See STOLZ, supra note 8, at 49.
15. See id. at 50-51.
16. See id. at 52.
CARRINGTON.FMT 04/01/99  4:59 PM
Page 79: Summer 1998] HIGHEST STATE COURTS 83
Despite the facts that the campaign against her was far from strong and that
she had the almost universal support of the press and the bar, she was retained
with only 51.7% of the vote, a much lower percentage than any of her three
colleagues running on the same ballot or of any predecessors on her court.  A
new form of political activity had been brought to life that has come to threaten
the integrity of the judiciaries of many states.
The 1978 campaign was, however, only the beginning of Justice Bird’s po-
litical difficulties.  In 1979, the state Commission on Judicial Performance con-
ducted an extensive but inconclusive investigation of charges that the court had
withheld publication of an opinion reversing a criminal conviction until after
the election for the illicit purpose of protecting the Chief Justice from the ad-
verse political reaction certain to attend the decision.17
In 1982, a substantial effort was mounted to secure her recall from office.
The effort was led by Howard Jarvis, the author of the successful initiative to
slash property taxes, and was supported by the Republican candidate for At-
torney General, but an insufficient number of signatures was obtained to put
the issue on the ballot.  Nevertheless, the Republican candidate for Governor,
running against Governor Brown, made the Bird appointment a major issue in
the campaign.18
Finally, in 1986, Bird and two other members of the court were defeated in
another retention election.19  Capital punishment was the chief issue in that
election, and the anti-retention campaign was financed with seven million dol-
lars raised mostly in small contributions from individual citizens affronted by
Chief Justice Bird’s obstinacy on that issue.  She and her colleagues spent over
four million dollars, most of it contributed by lawyers faithful to the principle
of judicial independence.20
The protestations that nonretention threatened the independence of the ju-
diciary were dismissed by the senator who had opposed Bird’s retention in 1978
as “Bull Pucky.”21  He argued that the referendum establishing the retention
election in 1934 had assured the voters that it entitled them to veto the Gover-
nor’s selection of a Justice “for any reason.”  Disapproval of several reversals
of criminal convictions was in his view ample reason to unseat a member of the
court.
Undeniably, the California Supreme Court had supplied its critics with an
ample list of decisions reflecting the court’s disregard for moral and political
                                                          
17. See id. at 267-360.
18. See MEDSGER, supra note 7, at 3-4.
19. Accounts of the 1986 election are John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Judicial Reform in Califor-
nia, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 156 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993); Jo-
seph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention
Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Ac-
countability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986).
20. See HARRY STUMPF & JOHN CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 43 (1992); see also
Thompson, supra note 19.
21. STOLZ, supra note 8, at 51.
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values widely shared by Californians.  The court thus supplied the voters with
many reasons to fire its members.  Its confrontational approach to its work had
been manifested some years before the appointment of Bird.  Notably, in the
years 1970-78, under the leadership of Chief Justice Donald Wright, the court
had made a number of decisions of extraordinarily high salience, causing Gov-
ernor Ronald Reagan, who had appointed Wright, to despise the court and his
appointee.22  The Wright court had repeatedly pushed the envelope of its politi-
cal role to its outer margins, and perhaps beyond.
Some of the reforms achieved by the Wright court were widely admired, but
some were not recognizable as interpretations of pre-existing legal texts or tra-
ditions.  The number and dimensions of the court’s reforms of California law
left little room for doubt that it had overtaken the state legislature as the place
where state policy was most likely to be made.  It had thus also displaced the
right of the people through state and local government to decide for themselves
what sort of place California ought to be.  One member of the court crowed
that he and his colleagues were using the Equal Protection Clause to remake
California as an egalitarian society,23 apparently whether the people liked it or
not.  Governor Brown, by his appointment of Bird, placed her in a cockpit
where she was destined to draw heavy political fire.24
Prominent among the court’s decrees antedating Bird’s appointment was a
reorganization of the state’s public school finance system which it found in 1971
to be inequitable and, therefore, unconstitutional.25  The objectionable feature
of the system was reliance on the local property tax, resulting in funding differ-
ences caused by disparities in the tax bases of different local school districts.
The court ordered the legislature to bring the system into compliance with an
equalizing commitment of state revenue.  The legislature obeyed reluctantly,
resulting in increased property taxes for many citizens and evoking the tax-
payer revolt led by Howard Jarvis.  The revolt took the form of a popular ref-
erendum, Proposition 13, rolling back taxation on realty and cutting deeply into
the sinew of the state’s previously abundant public fisc.26  Proposition 13 was a
serious blow from which public education and other public institutions in Cali-
fornia, including the courts, have not recovered.
The Wright court had then ordered the state to pay fees of $800,000 to a
public legal services office that had been the prevailing counsel in the school fi-
nance case,27 an order that the legislature long and defiantly refused to obey.28
                                                          
22. See MEDSGER, supra note 7, at 28-29.
23. See Stanley Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State Constitutional Rights Law, 496 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54 (1988).
24. It is ironic that the judge whose name has been most closely associated with arrogation of
power was appointed by a Governor who as much as any successful politician in recent decades cele-
brated the virtues of participatory democracy.
25. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1971), aff’d, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977); cf. San Anto-
nio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  For comment, see Paul D. Carrington, Financing
the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1973).
26. See William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607 (1996).
27. See Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977).
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This legislative contumacy reflected the annoyance of the legislature with the
court’s usurpation of its role and agenda.  In 1981, when the legislature again
refused to appropriate funds to comply with an order to pay a $25,000 fee to an
attorney who had successfully represented a claimant against the state, the
court ordered the Controller to pay the sum from the operating funds of the
Health Department.29
In 1972, the Wright court made another large splash in the state’s politics by
holding that capital punishment violated the “cruel and unusual punishment”
provision of the state constitution,30 a position also seriously considered and
then forsaken as impolitic by the Supreme Court of the United States.31  In
part, this holding was animated by concern for a situation that had accumulated
over a period of many years.  There were over 150 persons on California’s
death row awaiting execution; the court’s decision thus prevented an unseemly
slaughter of prisoners.  It was, however, promptly reversed by a popular initia-
tive amending the state constitution.32  Despite this rebuke, the Bird court con-
tinued to find reasons for preventing executions, and Bird herself was forth-
right in expressing her unwillingness to affirm any sentence of death.33
In 1975, the Wright court fearlessly and imprudently took on yet another
political issue arousing strong passions.  It did so by reinstating an order of a
California trial judge directing the Los Angeles schools to initiate a desegrega-
tion plan.34  The judge who had issued the order had already been resoundingly
defeated at the polls, one of the few California superior court judges ever to fail
of reelection.35  There had been no evidence presented in the case of de jure
segregation by the Los Angeles school board.  It was unlikely, on the facts pre-
sented at trial, that any federal court enforcing the federal Constitution would
have made the decision made by the defeated state judge. An organization
known as Bustop had mounted stout political resistance, resulting in the non-
reelection of the trial judge and a reversal of his decree in the intermediate
court, only to have it reinstated by the Wright court.36
The court in the 1970s also stretched the California law of torts to facilitate
the compensation of previously noncompensable harms.37  All forms of liability
                                                          
28. It was at last paid thirteen years later.  See Diana Walsh, Parents Give Millions Luckiest Public
School in the State, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 15, 1998, at B7 (quoting Stephen Sugarman).
29. See Mandel v. Myers, 629 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1981).
30. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
31. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflection on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
32. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27, approved by voters on November 7, 1972.
33. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Courts of Califor-
nia: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 237 (1989).
34. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 531 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
35. See STOLZ, supra note 8, at 33.
36. See id. at 35-36.
37. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (adopting comparative negligence
doctrine).  For contemporaneous comment, see Izhak Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.—A Belated and
Inglorious Centennial of the California Civil Code, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1977); Stanley A. Twardy, Jr.,
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insurance became notably more expensive, and a wag waspishly described the
court as having adopted the “doctrine of proximate solvency”:  The nearest
supply of money should be tapped to compensate whatever harms any citizen
might experience.
In addition, in a decision rendered shortly after Bird’s appointment, the
court held unconstitutional a standard clause in most of the mortgages on resi-
dential real estate in the state.38  The offending clause required the mortgagor
to pay off the loan on sale of the house.  As a result of the court’s decision,
many purchasers of homes could assume existing mortgages with lower interest
rates rather than acquire new mortgages that would, in the prevailing market,
bear higher rates.  The decision conferred an economic windfall on sellers and
buyers of residential real estate at the expense of mortgagees.  The secondary
effect was to raise interest rates on future home loans.
In all these endeavors, the court attempted to “bring reality into accord”39
with the moral and political values of a majority of its members.  Values not
widely shared by the people of California were forcibly read into the state’s
constitution.  In pursuing this course, the court was perhaps striving to follow
the leadership of the Warren Court.  In any case, the California court was
enormously overconfident of its ability to modify the beliefs and conduct of the
people.  The court failed to recognize the reality that few people change their
morals or their politics on the instruction of senior citizens in judicial robes.40
The court thereby sowed some of the seed of its own undoing.  A secondary
result of its activities was to alter the political environment in which it worked.
One assessment was that:
In the fifties and beyond, controversial judicial decisions had been defended by a
broad spectrum of politicians on the ground that what the courts ordered was the law
and deserved support even if the substance of a decision were distasteful.  As time
went on, however, political leaders tended to defend particular decisions only if they
agreed with the result.  As a consequence, the California court became identified with
the liberal side of the political spectrum, and attacking the court became easier for the
extreme right as moderates tended to withdraw from the debate.41
Thus, the court in effect consumed its political base and set the stage for the
triple defeat experienced in the retention election of 1986.  It had forsaken
even the pretense of an institution engaged in the interpretation of authorita-
tive legal texts or traditions enacted by the people or their representatives
whose votes they would need to retain their offices.  Given their accountability
to the electorate under the California constitution, the Justices were guilty of
                                                          
Justice Roger J. Traynor and the Development of Strict Liability in Products Liability Cases, 53 CONN.
B.J. 423 (1979).
38. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978).
39. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (“A judge’s job is to interpret
[legal texts] and bring reality into accord with them.”).
40. See Paul D. Carrington, Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court: A Pro-
posal to Restore Vitality to State and Local Politics, 50 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
41. See STOLZ, supra note 8, at 82.  But see JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1989).
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poor political judgment.  The consequence of that poor judgment was to make
their court a political toy and seriously diminish its legitimacy as a sober and
disinterested interpreter of the state’s legal texts.  While a valiant effort was
made to support the retention of the court, it was not possible to defend its de-
cisions as exercises of technical, professional judgment.
It bears repetition that the crisis thus emerging is centered in the highest
court in California.  Most of the political responsibility and visibility of any ju-
diciary is vested in its highest court.  Lower court judges have few opportunities
to make their states over into egalitarian societies whether the people like it or
not, because they are subject to the constraint of appellate review, as the high-
est court is not.  Also, there is in California, and in most states, a substantial
mechanism of judicial discipline intended to restrain and correct non-
reviewable abuses of power by lower court judges.  (It may be a remote conse-
quence of the poor political judgment of the Wright-Bird court that this admi-
rable disciplinary system may now itself have become an instrument of partisan
politics.42)  Because it is only the highest state courts that wield substantial po-
litical power, and which are on that account arguably legitimate objects of par-
tisan political concern, this article is attentive only to those institutions.  How-
ever, because lower court judges are also elected in most states, some of the
prescriptions set forth here may be equally applicable to elections to those of-
fices.
III
ANTECEDENT EVENTS: 1790-1970
Arrogance and poor political judgment were not the only malign influences
on the political environment of California or the other states in which similar
developments have occurred in the years since 1978.  The members of that
court are not alone to blame.  In part, the attacks on the Bird court were
merely a reversion to earlier times when many Americans had scorned their
courts and regarded them as suitable objects of unrestrained political competi-
tion.  Those earlier times in America were in line with experience elsewhere; a
judiciary that is free of intimidation and bribery is a rare thing in human expe-
rience.  Hence, few knowledgeable observers could have been surprised by the
unfortunate turn of events in California.
Since the earliest days of the Republic, judges commissioned with the
power to review legislation have been accused, and often not without cause, of
exceeding their authority and usurping the role of the legislative branches of
state and federal governments.  The people, assured of their right to self-
government, have repeatedly risen to throw off the yoke of judicial oppression.
Diverse means have been employed to that end.
                                                          
42. See Nancy McCarthy, Judge Faces Discipline for Opinion, CAL. BAR J., Aug. 1998, at 1.  It is
not altogether clear what motivates the Discipline Commission in this matter; it may be nothing more
than simple error in judgment.
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To be sure, the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have
withstood numerous challenges to their role and tenure.  McCulloch,43 Dart-
mouth College,44 Swift,45 Dred Scott,46 Pollock,47 Debs,48 Lochner,49 Adkins,50
Schechter,51 Engel,52 Miranda,53 and Roe54 are names marking a dozen instances
over two centuries in which the Court made decisions evoking powerful reac-
tions, including nullifying defiance and evasion, court packing and the threat of
court-packing, legislative withdrawal of jurisdiction, constitutional amendment,
and even civil war.  The Supreme Court, unlike all the hundreds of other courts
around the world on whom the power of judicial review has been conferred in
the last century and a half,55 is staffed by judges who enjoy tenure for life.
Thomas Jefferson was perhaps the first leader to decry that provision and to
call for term limits for Justices,56 and the thought has endured.57  Surely some
change in the tenure of the Justices would have been made long ago were the
Constitution not so difficult to amend.58
                                                          
43. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  For some of the response, see JOHN
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969); JOHN TAYLOR,
CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED (Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard
1820).
44. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).  For a reaction, see THOMAS
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 335 (2d ed. 1871).
45. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  For a reaction, see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE
AND SOURCES OF LAW 253 (Roland Gray ed., 2d ed. 1921).
46. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  For an account of the reaction, see DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
(1978).
47. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).  The reaction was the Sixteenth
Amendment.
48. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).  A brief account of the reaction is WILLIAM E. FORBATH,
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 192-98 (1991).
49. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  For an account of the reaction, see HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
50. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
51. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  The reaction was the court-
packing plan of 1937.  See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT  (1995).
52. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  For a reaction, see Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law En-
forcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  For reaction, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 189-95 (1991).
55. See Carrington, supra note 40.
56. See DONALD O. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF
MARBURY VS. MADISON 170-74 (1970).
57. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 23 (1997) (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch’s
(R.–Utah) remarks before the Federalist Society’s Tenth Anniversary Lawyers Convention held on
Nov. 15, 1996).
58. I have elsewhere advocated fifteen-year, nonrenewable terms for Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States.  See Carrington, supra note 40.
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No comparable impediment forestalled political responses to the impolitic
decisions of highest state courts.  Indeed, in Jefferson’s time, stronger passions
were directed at the political power of state judiciaries than at the Marshall
Court.  The Republic was not a decade old before it was widely realized that
those gaining high judicial office were men of common clay whose political
judgment was sometimes poor and occasionally horrid, and who sometimes un-
restrainedly deployed their political powers for ill-chosen purposes.59
The earliest abusers of judicial power in state courts were elite Federalists.
Chancellor James Kent, after Marshall the most eminent jurist of the age, was
forced into retirement by the New York legislature in protest against certain
“impact decisions” made by him as enforcer of the state constitution.60  Among
his decisions of dubious legitimacy was the invalidation of state law exercising
sovereignty over the formerly royalist Kings’ College, renamed Columbia by its
Federalist trustees.61  Less consequential political behavior was epidemic in
other states; for example, Federalist Judge Tapping Reeve in Connecticut, the
founder of the famous Litchfield Law School, was indicted for sedition by a
grand jury over which he presided in reaction to his comments about Jefferson
uttered from the bench.62  At the same time, Federalist legislators manifested
little concern for the independence of non-Federalist judges.  Thomas Cooper,
a friend of Jefferson’s, lost his judgeship in Pennsylvania at the initiative of
Federalists.63  And a Federalist legislature expelled all the Democratic judges
from the state courts in New Hampshire in 1813.64
Democrats were not less aggressive in these matters than Federalists.  The
Democratic legislature elected in Kentucky in 1824 fired all members of their
highest court (who were Whigs) and replaced them, as punishment for certain
decisions having unwelcome impact on tenants and debtors.65  By the 1830s, in
part to secure judicial independence from irresponsible governors and legisla-
tors, Jacksonian Democrats were everywhere advocating the election of
judges.66  By the middle of the nineteenth century, judges were elected in al-
most every state.67
                                                          
59. A useful history is MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL
SELECTION: THE CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES (1987).
60. See JOHN T. HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM 233-35 (1939).
61. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 547, 564 (1993).
62. See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL 126-35
(1986).
63. See DUMAS MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER, 1783-1839, at 199 (1926).
64. See EDWIN D. SANDBORN, HISTORY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE FROM ITS FIRST DISCOVERY TO
THE YEAR 1830, at 260-61 (1875).  This event formed part of the political context for the ouster of
Federalist trustees of Dartmouth College by Jeffersonians in 1817, an action reversed in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
65. See generally ARNDT M. STICKLES, THE CRITICAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KENTUCKY, 1819-
1829 (1929).
66. See FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 444-75 (John
William Ward ed., 1968) (1848).
67. See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 92-93 (1944).
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Even Francis Lieber, who was no Jacksonian, was at first persuaded that
this reform was necessary.68  While it was true, as Tocqueville observed, that
American politicians were greater sycophants than European courtiers, so
quick were they to profess their belief in the superior wisdom of the elector-
ate,69 the advocates of judicial elections seldom contended that “the people”
would wisely select their judges.  It was more commonly believed that elected
judges would likely be no worse than those who were appointed, and the fact of
their election would confer higher status on them, cause their judgments to
command greater respect, make it less likely that a legislature would intrude on
their proper role, and better fit them with experience useful to the political role
of judicial review of legislation.70  It was contended that the best arguments for
life tenure for judges were equally applicable to legislators and executive offi-
cers.  Also, when bad judges are elected, the people have themselves to blame,
and, if their terms in office are limited, the people are assured of an opportu-
nity to correct their mistakes.  Thomas Cooley, the much-honored Chief Justice
of Michigan, even after his own defeat for reelection in 1885, defended the
practice.71  And Lord Bryce, the Tocqueville of the 1890s, although appalled at
the idea of electing judges, concluded that persons elected to judicial office in
America were as competent as those who were appointed and were, unlike
English judges, selected from all classes72 and thus gained wider public trust.
Despite the fact that most nineteenth century state court judges had to
stand for election, the class bias afflicting law in the federal courts was not re-
stricted to the federal judiciary.  The law of torts emerged from its origins in the
common law forms of action to be fashioned by highest state courts as a shelter
from liability for nascent industry.73  The appointed highest state court in Con-
necticut in 1909 even presumed to invalidate the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act,74 a decision reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1917.75
                                                          
68. See FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 238-45 (Theodore D.
Woolsey ed., 3d ed. 1874).
69. See I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 289 (Henry Reeve trans., 1837)
(1835) (“It would have been impossible for the sycophants of Louis XIV to flatter more dexterously.”).
70. The best statement of the case for the election of judges may be GRIMKE, supra note 66, at
438-75.  See also Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993).  For accounts of elected judges,
see Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery and Judicial Professionalism: The Careers of Midwestern
State Appellate Court Judges, 1861-1899, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA 29 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Kermit L. Hall, The “Route to Hell” Retraced: The Impact
of Popular Election on the Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 229 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1984).
71. See Everett S. Brown, The Contribution of Thomas M. Cooley to Bryce’s “American Com-
monwealth”, 31 MICH. L. REV. 346, 353 (1933).
72. See 1 AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 670-71 (1894).
73. For a sympathetic account of the restrictive doctrines then in force, see Thomas M. Cooley, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACTS
(1879).
74. See Hoxie v. New York, 73 A. 754 (Conn. 1909).
75. See New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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Elected judges in New York76 and Montana77 in 1911 held their states’ industrial
accident laws to be unconstitutional.  The problem of class bias was perhaps
most acute in California, where the judiciary, although elected, was widely per-
ceived to be a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific Railroad.78
By the end of the nineteenth century, the demerits of judicial elections were
increasingly evident.79  In rural counties, where the people knew the lawyers,
such elections could perhaps be regarded as authentic democratic politics, but
they intensified fears of hometown prejudice against nonresident parties.
Elsewhere such elections were often marked by a very low level of information
and interest among the electorate.  And there were at least three more serious
problems that the advocates of judicial elections had not anticipated.80
One was the harmful role of political parties.  Their nominations and sup-
port went to party regulars and contributors.81  As the urban machines acquired
a bad odor in the late nineteenth century, so did the judges to whom they sold
places on the ballot.  Judges beholden to political parties, it was argued, could
not be trusted to decide cases independently of their political masters.  A nota-
ble casualty of the process was the father of Benjamin Cardozo, who was ac-
cused of being a Tammany Hall subordinate and driven from office during a
moment of reform.82  In addition, judicial candidates wearing party labels were
likely to win or lose with the ticket, Thomas Cooley being a premier example of
a distinguished judge buried in a partisan avalanche.  On the other hand, politi-
cal organizations when competitive, because their self-interest extended be-
yond the outcome of a particular election, sometimes screened out grievously
underqualified candidates who might otherwise have won election.83
A second problem was the source of campaign funds for judicial candi-
dates.84  Judicial candidates receive money from lawyers and litigants appearing
in their courts; rarely are there contributions from any other source.  Even
when the amounts are relatively small, the contributions look a little like bribes
or shake-downs related to the outcomes of past or future lawsuits.  A funda-
mental difference exists between judicial and legislative offices in this respect
                                                          
76. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
77. See Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 119 P. 554 (Mont. 1911).
78. See GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 59-60 (1951).
79. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 713-29 (1995); Hall, The “Route to Hell” Retraced, supra note 70.
80. See, e.g., Tuesday, February 11, 1868: The Day North Carolina Chose Direct Election of Judges:
A Transcript of the Debates from the 1868 Constitutional Convention, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (John V.
Orth ed., 1992).
81. This remains a feature of partisan judicial elections in numerous states.  See Roy A. Schotland,
Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American De-
mocracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 65-66 (1985).  Schotland notes, for example, the refusal of the Democratic
chair in Brooklyn in 1982 to allow Democratic judges to accept cross-endorsement by Republicans, for
the reason that this would reduce the funding available to the party.
82. See Andrew L. Kaufman, The First Judge Cardozo: Albert, Father of Benjamin, 11 J.L. &
RELIGION 271, 310 (1995).
83. Absent party control, the election is often decided by name recognition.  For numerous exam-
ples, see Schotland, supra note 81, at 86-89.
84. See id. at 59-63.
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because judges decide the rights and duties of individuals even when they are
making policy; hence any connection between a judge and a person appearing
in his or her court is a potential source of mistrust.  For example, in a recent
poll in Ohio, almost ninety percent of the citizens polled believed that judicial
decisions are influenced by campaign contributions.85  There have been cele-
brated occasions in other states when very large contributions were made by
lawyers or parties who thereafter secured large favorable judgments or remu-
nerative appointments such as receiverships.86  Such events contribute to public
cynicism about our courts.
The resemblance of campaign contributions to bribes becomes especially
strong when the candidate finds that it is not necessary to spend all the money
received on a campaign and retains some of it as a salary supplement, a practice
not always forbidden by state law.87  Or when a candidate who borrows money
to fund a campaign thereafter asks lawyers to pay his or her debts.88  Indeed,
there are occasions when an implicit threat of lawyers or parties to withhold
funds and to support a rival candidate would be far more intimidating to a sit-
ting judge than, say, a mere picket on the courthouse steps who, it has been
held, may be punished for contempt of court.89
A third difficulty specific to judicial campaigns is their substantive content.
Political candidates generally succeed by appealing to the prejudices of their
constituents, and this is often achieved by promises bespeaking closed minds on
issues of primary concern.  Judicial candidates cannot make such campaign
promises regarding their decisions in future cases in which the parties have not
yet been heard without sacrificing the disinterest and open mind they are ex-
pected to bring to their work.  While professional ethical standards may pro-
scribe such campaign promises,90 many have failed to practice the appropriate
                                                          
85. See CITIZENS’ COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS app. B (1995) (on file with author).
86. For a recent example, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld an enormous punitive damage
award after every member of the court had received sizeable contributions from counsel for the plain-
tiff.  See Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 24, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Abcnew File; ABC World News Tonight: Americana Agenda Alabama Supreme Court’s Largesse
(ABC television broadcast, Oct. 9, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Abcnew File.  Pennzoil
lawyers contributed $315,000 to members of the Texas court deciding its enormous claim against Tex-
aco, and four of the judges receiving contributions were not facing reelection campaigns.  See Madison
B. McClellan, Note, Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer’s Guide to Judicial Se-
lection Methods in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 555 (1991).  Alabama and Texas have since modified
their rules of judicial conduct to prohibit these types of contributions.  See Ala. Code § 12-24-1 (1975 &
Supp. 1996); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.155 (West 1998) (limiting contributions to judicial candi-
dates or officeholders).
87. Salary supplementation has been provided at times without the cover of campaign contribu-
tions.  Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy, for example, received a substantial subvention from Wal-
ter Chrysler during his years of service on the Detroit Recorder’s Court.  See SIDNEY FINE, FRANK
MURPHY: THE DETROIT YEARS 193-94 (1975).  That subvention cannot be linked to any of Murphy’s
many judicial acts.
88. See, e.g., David Fraser, Letter Asks Help to Cut Judge’s Debt, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, July 16, 1994, at 1A.
89. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
90. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1059-68 (1996).  The Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7 was modified in
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restraint,91 and it is arguable that they have a constitutionally protected right to
make the promises.92  One elected judge confronted with the problem of finding
something to say has told me that he promises each voter he meets that if they
ever have a case in his court, they can count on him to be their friend.
Lawyers resisted the election of judges in the nineteenth century, and the
resistance intensified after the turn of the century when the bar organizations
became politically active.  Roscoe Pound’s famous 1906 address to the ABA93
aroused a strenuous effort to find other means to select judges.  Resistance to
elections was generally expressed as concern for judicial independence, but also
reflected concern for the social status of courts and lawyers.  In the industrial
age emerging in the last decade of the century, professional credentials ac-
quired an importance they had previously lacked and the organized bar, along
with other credentialed professions, gained political strength.  A boom in
higher education94 led to the establishment by 1920 of the graduate professional
law school as the common training ground of an elite profession very different
from that led in the late nineteenth century by Thomas Cooley.95  Governmen-
tal institutions of all kinds were increasingly conducted by technocratic profes-
sionals, and the legal profession sought to assure that judges would not be least
among them.
Among Pound’s allies was William Howard Taft, who ardently favored the
professionalization of the judiciary.  Among his most memorable public state-
ments was his admission that he loved judges and thought of them as the sort of
people he hoped to meet in Heaven “under a just God.”96  He advocated judi-
cial law reform for the purpose of reducing cost and delay, urging that reforms
of that sort would better serve the interests of disadvantaged citizens encoun-
tering difficulty in enforcing their rights than would an enlargement of their
substantive entitlements.97  What Taft, himself a social Darwinist, could not see
were the reasons that many of his contemporaries were enraged with the politi-
                                                          
1990 to relax the constraints.  Alabama and North Carolina are two states that have recently modified
Canon 7 to accommodate greater freedom of candidates to express political ideas while striving at the
same time to create moral pressures on judicial candidates to abide the previous rule.  See AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N, SPECIAL COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AGENDA BOOK, 1998 ANNUAL
MEETING.
91. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 81, at 66, 79-80.
92. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993); Stretton v. Discipli-
nary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744
F.Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990); J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991).
93. See The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprinted in 20
JUDICATURE 178 (1937).
94. See generally LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
(1965).
95. See generally ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983).
96. “I love judges and I love courts.  They are my ideals.  They typify on earth what we shall meet
hereafter in heaven under a just God.”  Speech to Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, N.Y. EVENING
POST, Oct. 6, 1911.
97. See Special Message of the President of the United States Returning Without Approval House
Joint Resolution No. 14, H.R. DOC. NO. 62-106 (1911).
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cal conduct of the judiciaries denying diverse claims of right, both federal and
state.98  As President, he invested much of his energy and political capital in re-
sisting law reforms aiming to hold judges accountable to an electorate.
Another line of Progressive reform competing with Taft’s was animated by
hostility to what was decried as “Judicial Oligarchy.”99  Seven states adopted
constitutional provisions for the recall of elected officers,100 including judges, a
proposal horrifying to political conservatives professing to cherish the inde-
pendence of the judiciary from political intimidation.  Because such a provision
was in the draft Arizona constitution, President Taft vetoed the Arizona state-
hood resolution, effectively requiring deletion of the offending clause.101  He
was supported by politically conservative senators such as George Sutherland
of Utah and Elihu Root of New York.102  One response to his veto was an
overwhelming vote of the people of California rejecting his position by adding
to their constitution precisely the recall provision causing him to veto Ari-
zona’s.103  In practice, these radical provisions were seldom invoked, and never
so far as appears was a judge recalled for ideological reasons.  Whether, as in-
tended, it made some judges behave less like free-wheeling legislators104 is un-
known.
Colorado took a different step, providing in its constitution for review by
referendum of judicial decisions, another plan reviled by Taft.105  Theodore
Roosevelt had until 1911 opposed radical structural reforms such as the recall
of judges, but the decision of the New York Court of Appeals invalidating the
state’s mandatory workmen’s compensation law sent him over the top with
rage.106  Disregarding social and economic data depicting the oppression of la-
bor, the court held that employers were guaranteed the right by both federal
and state constitutions to employ workers without taking responsibility for
                                                          
98. See Walter F. Dodd, The Recall and the Political Responsibility of Judges, 10 MICH. L. REV. 79,
85 (1911).
99. See GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912); see also WILLIAM L. RANSOM,
MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CON-
STITUTIONAL CHANGE AFFECTING THE RELATION OF COURTS TO LEGISLATION (1912); J. Patrick
White, Progressivism and the Judiciary: A Study of the Movement for Judicial Reform, 1901-1917, at
150-51 (1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (quoting Sen. Robert Owen
(D.–Okla.)).
100. Recall was first adopted in Oregon in 1908, and little consideration was given to the possible
exclusion of judges from that provision.  See generally ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE
STORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN OREGON (1912).
101. See White, supra note 99, at 205.  Taft later described the plan as legalized terrorism.
102. See id. at 198-201.  For a ringing defense of the judiciary, see J. HAMPDEN DOUGHERTY,
POWER OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY OVER LEGISLATION (1912).
103. See White, supra note 99, at 96.
104. See id. at 150.  In Arizona, recall of judges was passionately supported by many mine workers
as a “Declaration of Independence” from the federal territorial judges so given to strike-breaking in-
junctions.  See id. at 127.
105. “The people at the polls, no more than kings upon the throne are fit to pass upon questions
involving the judicial interpretation of the law.”  GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN
AND THE JUDGE 213 (1994).  See generally WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS
ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE, AND ITS PERILS (1913).
106. See White, supra note 99, at 349.
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their work-related injuries.107  “It is out of the question,” Roosevelt said, “that
the courts should be permitted permanently to shackle our hands as they would
shackle them by decisions such as this.”108  He proposed for New York the
Colorado provision allowing a right of appeal to the people through a referen-
dum on the constitutionality of legislation.109  Even Learned Hand, though a
devoted follower of Roosevelt, thought ill of this idea as a perversion of the ju-
dicial role in constitutional adjudication.110  It was also hopelessly cumber-
some,111 and it cost Roosevelt support in the presidential campaign of 1912.112
That TR was driven to advocate such a solution puts in perspective the court-
packing plan proposed by FDR a quarter of a century later.113
Ohio, North Dakota, and Nebraska took a different tack to reform,
amending their constitutions to require supermajority votes of their highest
courts to invalidate legislation.114  Arizona in 1912 enacted a statute creating a
novel process by which the voters of Arizona could advise a federal judge that
his or her services were no longer desired in Arizona.115  This action reflected
dissatisfaction with labor injunctions issued by federal courts.
The direct democracy movement began to fade after 1912.116  Meanwhile,
however, the direct primary had the unintended effect of weakening the ability
of party organizations to prevent the election of seriously underqualified
judges.117  And the lengthening of the ballot to a “bed sheet” of votes further
diminished the likelihood that voters were exercising knowing choices.  The
prospects of election for candidates with familiar names but no qualifications
were thus materially enhanced by Progressive reforms.
In this environment, the organized bar sought and found compromise
methods of selecting and retaining judges.  Some states fashioned
“nonpartisan” elections by taking judicial candidates off the partisan tickets.
This weakened the influence of the parties, but made judges more vulnerable to
                                                          
107. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 448 (N.Y. 1911).
108. Workmen’s Compensation, 98 THE OUTLOOK 49 (May 13, 1911); see also Theodore Roosevelt,
Introduction to WILLIAM L. RANSOM, supra note 99, at 3-24.
109. See 18 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 244, 274 (Herman Hagedorn ed., 1920) (describing
presidential speech at Carnegie Hall, New York, on Oct. 20, 1911).  An account of this remarkable
event is provided by Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State
Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 933-49 (1997).
110. See White, supra note 99, at 367.
111. See, e.g., People v. Max, 198 P. 150 (1921).
112. See White, supra note 99, at 384.  It has, however, lately been revived in ROBERT H. BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 96-122 (1996).
113. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 51, at 132-79.
114. See id. at 420.
115. See id. at 421-22.
116. See generally Patrick L. Baude, A Comment on The Evolution of Direct Democracy in Western
State Constitutions, 28 N.M. L. REV. 343 (1998).
117. See William H. Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 REP. AM. BAR ASS’N 418, 422-23
(1913).
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other influences, and further facilitated the election by mistake of candidates
blessed with names made familiar by other persons.118
More popular with the bar was the idea of merit selection, sometimes de-
noted as the Missouri Plan.  This scheme entrusted the nomination of judges to
a group adorned with professional credentials and then subjected those chosen
by this elite to retention elections, that is, elections in which there is a choice to
vote yes or no on the retention of a sitting judge.119  The American Judicature
Society was established in 1913 to improve judicial administration and soon be-
gan to foster that idea.120  It was adopted in diverse forms in many states.121
Whether the Missouri Plan in any of its numerous variations has had signifi-
cant effect on the technical competence of high court judges is at best uncer-
tain.  It seems unlikely that it materially elevated the moral and political judg-
ment of those selected, given the uncertainty inherent in that standard of merit.
The meager evidence indicates that merit-selection judges entered office with
credentials substantially similar to those of elected judges122 and that partisan
politics are not wholly suppressed, at least in Missouri.123  And it may be that
elected judges are, as Lord Bryce believed them to be, more in touch with “the
common thoughts of men”124 and possessed of a more “accurate appreciation of
                                                          
118. See David Adamany & Philip DuBois, Electing State Judges, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 731; Philip L.
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REV. 395 (1984); Ray M. Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162 (1969).
119. Proposed by Albert Kales in 1914, it was first adopted in Missouri in 1940.  See Maura Ann
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120. See generally MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (1990); STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 20.  The
idea was also approved by the American Bar Association in 1937.  See Schoshinski, supra note 119, at
847.
121. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have some form of commission.  A summary of
the variations is provided in Polly Price, Selection of State Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND
IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 16-19 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).
122. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 13-17 (1980); HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 138-39 (2d ed.,
1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 689, 724 (1995); Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial
Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987); Peter D.
Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
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comes: DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD ON STATE SUPREME
COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995); Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R.
Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make? Selection Procedures in State Courts
of Last Resort, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25 (1979); Gerald S. Gryski et al., Models of State Court Decision Mak-
ing in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143 (1986);.
123. See STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 20, at 42.
124. [W]e fail to appreciate the dignity of our profession if we look for it either in profundity of
learning or in forensic triumphs.  Its reason for being must be found in the effective aid it
renders to justice and in the sense that it gives of public security through its steady support of
public order.  These are commonplaces, but the strength of law lies in its commonplace char-
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the requirements of the community”125 than merit-selected judges, qualities that
may be especially important for judges sitting on the high courts.
The retention election was adopted by some states that did not adopt merit-
selection for their highest courts.126  And Japan adapted the idea for use in its
constitutional court, whose members are selected by the cabinet, then promptly
stand for election once without opposition.127  In the Japanese form, it might be
aptly described as a confirmation election.
As originally envisioned by the retention election’s proponents, it was ex-
pected that the professional judge running without opposition would be re-
tained in the absence of scandalous misconduct.128  It was a device to satisfy the
voters’ appetite for self-governance without risk that they would have any im-
proper influence on judges or cause the electoral process to impose improper
pressures upon them.  For decades it worked, and no judge standing for reten-
tion failed to achieve it.  While the prospect of a retention election could be a
restraint and even somewhat intimidating,129 the institution has been popular
with most judges who have experience with it.130
These successive waves of reform mean that the doctrine of separation of
powers expressed in the Constitution of the United States has acquired diverse
forms in the varied state constitutions.  The differences are numerous.  For ex-
ample, highest state courts in several states have a constitutional power to en-
act procedural rules for use in inferior courts,131 a power that was not conferred
on the Supreme Court of the United States until 1934 and that is subject always
to the overriding power of Congress.132  Some state courts have gone so far as to
hold that procedural matters are beyond the kin of legislatures and are their
own exclusive responsibility.133  In some states, the power to enforce standards
of judicial conduct is vested within the judicial branch; in others, it is reserved
to the legislature or to the voters.134  Courts in many states have successfully in-
                                                          
acter; and it becomes feeble and untrustworthy when it expresses something different from
the common thoughts of men.
Thomas M. Cooley, Address, in A RECORD OF COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH,
1886, ON THE TWO HUNDRED FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF HARVARD COLLEGE 95 (1887).
125. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 166 (1881) (describing Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw).
126. See generally SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1980).
127. JAPAN CONST. art. 79, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 20
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds., 1990).
128. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Political Trust and Judicial Retention Elections, 9 LAW
& POL’Y 451 (1987).
129. See Joseph R. Grodin, supra note 19.
130. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JU-
DICATURE 306 (1994).
131. See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. V, §2.
132. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)).
133. See, e.g., Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1950).
134. See Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
59 (Summer 1998).
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voked their inherent power to compel legislatures to provide funds needed for
their operation, a power never claimed by the federal courts.135  The issue of in-
dependence or accountability is therefore a somewhat different issue in each
state, and different for any state court than for the federal judiciary.136  It may
be acceptably democratic that elected judges take actions and exercise powers
that would be regarded as illegitimate if taken by judges selected by a merit
panel or serving with life tenure.
The meritocratic reforms initiated by Taft and Pound may have been inher-
ently unstable.  They expressed and reinforced the formalist or technocratic
tendencies of the courts to which they were applied.  In this respect, they fit the
tendency of some legal educators in the late nineteenth century, led by Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell, to persuade the bar and the public that law and
politics are distinct universes.137  They were part of a formal moment in Ameri-
can law.  That formalism quickly came under attack, for it was obvious, as it
had been to the generation that revolted against British rule and to Jacksonians
and Populists, that courts of last resort exercising the power of judicial review
are political as well as legal institutions and cannot disavow politics however
much they might wish to do so.138  The Legal Realists of the 1920s were most
outspoken in their attack on this formalism.  The New York Court of Appeals
led by Benjamin Cardozo reflected this more sophisticated (and more tradi-
tionally American) jurisprudence,139 as did the Supreme Court of California led
by Roger Traynor in the post-World War II era.140  But even those courts were
politically cautious and did not venture far from the legal texts and traditions
used to explain their decisions, and their notable decisions seldom dealt with
politically sensitive issues.  Karl Llewellyn, a hard-core Legal Realist, was able
to write in 1960 that the judges of our highest state courts were remarkably pro-
fessional and their decisions “reckonable” by one familiar with the controlling
                                                          
135. See Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial
Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217 (1993).
136. See James M. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of
State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219 (1998); Ellen A.
Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L.
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137. See Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 691 (1995).
138. In contrast, “Canadians are not conditioned to think of courts as part of the political sys-
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1643 (1995).
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texts and traditions.141  It was almost foreseeable that courts failing to observe
such caution (such as the Wright-Byrd court) would be returned to the political
maelstrom from which Taft and Pound had delivered them.
IV
 THE CURRENT CRISIS
The Supreme Court of California in the years after the appointment of
Chief Justice Wright in 1970, by its lack of self-restraint and disregard for the
legislative process, departed from professional traditions that were only a half-
century old.  And its rash deployment of political power after 1970 was not
unique to California.  Other highest state courts also began to assert them-
selves; new parameters and new principles were discovered in state constitu-
tions.142  In some measure, this movement seems to have been inspired by the
role model of the Warren Court,143 which seemed for a generation of lawyers to
have demonstrated that anything legislatures can do, courts can do better.144
The result is that courts in states other than California have by their heroic
deeds weakened their political bases.  They have sometimes conflated the idea
of judicial “independence” from extrinsic intimidation and control with the
post-modern idea of independence as the right of judges to decide cases with-
out regard for the legal texts they supposedly interpret and without respect for
the expectations of the citizens they serve.
State constitutional law had been a subject of signal importance in the nine-
teenth century.  Thomas Cooley’s magisterial work on that subject145 is gener-
ally conceded to have been the best American law book of the time.  What
happened in the 1970s was thus a rediscovery of a political role more familiar to
the nineteenth century than to the mid-twentieth century.  Highest state courts
opened what has been described as a forum-shopping opportunity “for liber-
                                                          
141. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
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Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).  On its influence, see Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Liti-
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als.”146  Or, as former Justice Grodin of California has described, there was a
discovery that state constitutions guaranteed happiness and safety for all.147
Some state courts, in rediscovering their states’ constitutions, tended to
track the holdings of the Warren Court, but some were more autonomous.148
For several reasons, the interpretation of state constitutions is a materially dif-
ferent professional task than is the interpretation of the federal Constitution.
One reason is that most highest state courts are more accountable to the elec-
torate than is the Supreme Court of the United States.  Another is that a state
constitution is everywhere more easily amended if the highest court should
misinterpret it;149 this may tend to justify a more free-wheeling, common law
type of judicial creativity.150  A third is that most state constitutions are more
elaborate, or less cryptic, than the federal Constitution.151  To the extent that a
state court is enforcing an explicit provision of a state constitution, no issue of
judicial usurpation arises.  It is the use of broad constitutional terms as the basis
for the appropriation to the courts of power over heavily contested political is-
sues that invites impairment of judicial independence by the threat of political
retaliation.  While much of what the highest state courts have done in recent
decades through novel interpretations of constitutional language can be de-
fended as humane and perhaps even wise on the political merits, there has been
a foreseeable reaction threatening to the independence of the courts involved.
One obvious field for the endeavors of newly exhilarated courts was a re-
structuring of tort law.  Where their predecessors had erected defenses, modern
courts followed California in expanding liability, and even went so far as to
immunize some of what they had done from legislative reconsideration by de-
claring the rights they created to have constitutional roots.  For a recent exam-
ple, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Illinois set aside elaborate tort reform leg-
islation that was the product of prolonged political debate and deliberation,
holding that caps on general damages are unconstitutionally discriminatory
against those suffering the most.152
There were also numerous holdings enforcing previously unknown rights of
welfare clients having no federal counterparts.153  The Supreme Court of Alaska
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found a right of privacy that included the right to possess and use marijuana at
home.154  The Supreme Court of Hawaii raised the possibility that same-sex
marriages are constitutionally protected.155  The latter decision set off a storm
of reaction that included legislation by Congress and the state of Maine156 and
constitutional amendments in 1998 in Hawaii and Alaska, all designed to pre-
vent recognition of same-sex marriages.157 Meanwhile, the Hawaii legislature
sensibly enacted a statute creating a new legal relationship called “reciprocal
beneficiaries.”158
The Supreme Court of New Jersey led the way in invalidating exclusionary
standards imposed by suburban zoning boards.159  In doing so, the court created
complex standards to be enforced by private claimants.160  These were in due
course displaced by the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, which relies on building
contractors for enforcement.  Whether the court’s role in this development was
beneficial or not is a matter that remains in dispute.  Two members of the court
responsible for the decision encountered serious resistance in a retention elec-
tion, and even very sympathetic observers have been critical.  Charles Haar,
long an opponent of exclusionary zoning, limited his criticism to the court’s ef-
forts at public relations.161  But it is by no means clear what the court could have
done, consistent with its role, to promote better public understanding of the is-
sue.  And John Payne, a New Jersey lawyer no less opposed to exclusionary
zoning than Haar, found the court’s holding to be too complex, too arbitrary,
and too counterintuitive to be comprehensible to the public.162  As Payne ob-
served, the root of the problem is that New Jersey had unwisely empowered
zoning commissions having constituencies that were too small and too homo-
geneous; the court might have corrected that legislative blunder by less heroic
means than it employed.
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In addition, numerous state supreme courts followed the California court’s
lead in undertaking to reorganize the school finance systems of their states.163
The New Jersey court, for example, soon followed California in requiring
statewide equalization of revenue available to schools164 and went beyond the
California court in the means deployed to enforce its policy when the legisla-
ture was unable to agree on a suitable financial scheme.165  Other state supreme
courts followed.166  Members of the Vermont and New Hampshire courts were
under political attack in 1998 for such decisions bearing on school finance.167
Few persons knowledgeable about public education would deny that local
finance of public schools is problematic:  Differentials in tax bases of local dis-
tricts are reflected in the financial resources available to schools and thus result
in inequalities in the educational services provided.  Jonathan Kozol, who has
made a career expressing humanitarian, if sometimes ill-considered, ideas
about public education, toured America to tell us in painful detail that schools
with less money have fewer facilities and provide fewer services than those with
more money.168  His work persuaded many high court judges that they should
intervene to correct this inequity.  In doing so, they ignored strong evidence
that there is meager correlation between the social and economic status of the
families of schoolchildren and the abundance of the tax base of their local
schools.  And equally strong evidence that there is little connection between
the size of public school budgets and the educational outcomes they produce.169
Moreover, local taxation is linked closely to local control of the public schools,
a tradition reflecting the reality that schools are an extension of, as well as a
surrogate for, the family.  The best schools tend to be those in which parents
take the most interest.  It would be a better world if parents most concerned
with the education of their children would take a serious interest in the learning
of children afflicted with a disadvantage, such as being the child of a single,
working parent, but they do not.  The most we can realistically expect is that
they will take an interest in the children in their immediate vicinity.  For this
reason, in state after state, when the issue has been put to voters, they have
voted for local control and against statewide equalization, and that preference
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has been shared by voters in school districts having scant financial resources,
who (wisely or not) seem generally to prefer local control to additional revenue
that must come with the string attached of greater state involvement.170  It ap-
pears that the chief advocates for state finance and control are the teachers’
unions.  At a time when public faith in the institutions of public education
seems to be declining despite relatively high expenditures, and many families
are withdrawing their children from public schools either by keeping them at
home or by electing to pay private school tuitions, centralization of public
schools may be precisely the policy that is not needed.171  Whatever may be the
most prudent method of financing locally controlled schools, it seems undebat-
able that the issue is one best resolved by state legislatures who are in touch
with the desires of the local electorates, who care most about their schools, and
who are equipped to compromise the conflicting values and to correct their
mistakes.172
In addition to these overt acts of highest state courts, legislatures and execu-
tive officers of states have become accustomed to using the courts as lightning
rods to absorb political anger.  An excellent example is provided by the 1998
settlement of the cigarette wars.  All states had long taxed the sale of cigarettes,
and many a highway had been paved with the proceeds.  A justification for such
taxation had been that cigarettes are harmful to health, a fact well-known for
centuries.  At any time, any state could have raised its tax, and could have spent
the proceeds on public health initiatives, including renewed efforts to discour-
age teen-age smoking.  In lieu of such forthright policy-making, bogus cases
were filed in state courts by states’ attorneys general and then settled for bil-
lions of dollars to be paid over a period of twenty-five years, in substance as an
additional tax on the product, with much public beating of breasts by the attor-
neys general.  The transaction was an effort of tobacco companies to resolve a
mounting political and legal crisis by co-opting the attorneys general and some
members of the private bar well-known for their representation of personal in-
jury plaintiffs who have been rewarded with mind-boggling fees paid by to-
bacco companies for agreeing to resolve all future claims by state or local gov-
ernments.
Although many involved with public health have mounted an ambitious ef-
fort to eliminate the use of tobacco (much as we have previously eliminated the
use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine!),173 it is not clear that they have the sup-
port of the electorate or of state legislatures.  Gubernatorial candidates in Mas-
sachusetts and Minnesota who actively supported the anti-smoking campaign
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were defeated in 1998 elections.174  A troublesome feature of the initiative is its
conflict with the spirit of individual responsibility suffusing many of the judicial
heroics of recent decades.  Cigarette smokers are the group having the most di-
rect interest in the issue, and although abashed, they are not without political
influence sufficient to prevent the election of a gubernatorial candidate hostile
to their interests.  The effect of the 1998 settlement was to direct their anger at
the courts.  The secondary message is that smokers and anti-smokers must con-
test for control over the highest state courts rather than the legislatures.
Just as tobacco settled, the cities of New Orleans and Chicago sued the
makers and sellers of handguns for the cost of treating gunshots in public emer-
gency rooms.  The cities likely have legislative authority to regulate and per-
haps even forbid the sale of handguns within the cities, but neither has author-
ity to enact tort law, especially tort law favoring itself, however wise the
imposition of liability may be from the perspective of those, including this
author, who deplore the availability of such weapons.  But there can be little
doubt that the political ramifications are enormous, and almost certainly be-
yond the capacity of any state’s judicial system to manage.  The passion and
political power of gun owners is all too visible.  Using the courts to circumnavi-
gate the influence of gun lobbies is a recipe for political disaster.  As the editors
of The Economist remarked, “[i]f America is ever to get its priorities right on
tobacco, guns or any other issue, it will do so only in the debating chamber of
democratically elected legislatures, not through threats of mass litigation.”175
While unwelcome political decisions by highest state courts and by other
public officers have contributed to the present environment of mistrust, there
are also decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that have made
highest state courts more inviting targets of political intervention.  One cause of
intense judicial campaigns is the decision of the Court requiring regular reap-
portionment of both state and federal legislative districts.176  Reapportionment
plans are now a frequent object of litigation, and the issues are ultimately
brought to rest in highest state courts.177  Thus, by controlling a highest state
court, a party or interest group can materially influence the composition of a
congressional delegation and their state’s legislature.  This seems the most
likely motive of recent efforts to replace certain members of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee.
An additional complexity of judicial politics in some states was created by
the Court’s recent interpretation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.178  It was not
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until 1991 that the Court held the Act applicable to judicial elections.179  It is
not yet clear what, if any, changes will be needed to bring systems of once-
segregated states into full compliance with the Act’s requirements.180  What is
clear is that some method must be found to assure participation in the judiciary
of minorities who were excluded by reason of past discrimination.  In this arti-
cle, I will not attempt to address the issues thus presented, in part because they
are somewhat different in each of the fifteen states affected.  It is mentioned
here in part to observe that federal legislation, as well as the Constitution of the
United States, bears on the choices open to states in selecting their judges.  This
was not true until recent times.  When Taft and Pound and their contemporar-
ies were considering the issues now before us, there was no applicable federal
law to consider.  It is also important to note that any change in the method of
judicial selection in the affected states must be approved by the Department of
Justice.181
Also, the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade is having a con-
tinuing secondary effect on the politics of state courts.  A substantial portion of
the population continue to regard that decision as profoundly evil and illegiti-
mate.  Because of the extra-legal and sometimes violent reaction of some per-
sons of that persuasion, it may be more difficult to get an abortion in 1998 than
it was in 1972.182  More gentle persons of that same persuasion have directed
their hostility at state court judges having no responsibility for what the Su-
preme Court did.  In 1998, two members of the California court were chal-
lenged for retention despite the fact that both are conservative Republicans.183
They gave offense to the religious right by adhering (as they believed) to
precedent established by the Court with respect to the right of adolescent fe-
males to abort without the consent of their parents.184  A current and strenuous
effort to gain political control over the Florida court is animated by the same
purpose.185
In response to all this highly visible judicial behavior, many other political
interest groups and parties began about 1980 to take a heightened interest in
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judicial elections.  In some states, tort and insurance law moved to the top of
the political agenda for judicial elections.  By 1980, local groups of personal
injury lawyers were organized to secure the election of judges favoring their
clients.  For a time, they seemed to control elections to the Supreme Court of
Texas.186  Their success, however, evoked a response from insurance companies
and others whose financial interests were threatened by a “plaintiffs’ court,”
and in recent years, “habitual defendants” have been more successful in secur-
ing election of judges thought to favor their interests.187  A similar series of
events has occurred in Alabama,188 and less visibly in several other states.189
In such an environment, the Taft-Pound reforms are endangered. “Merit
selection” is seen by many as a masquerade to put political power in the hands
of the organized bar and other members of the elite.  It was overwhelmingly de-
feated in 1987 in a ballot initiative in Ohio supported by the bar and the League
of Women Voters, but opposed by the AFL-CIO.190  The religious right is pres-
ently attacking the existing merit selection system in Florida,191 and their attack
may be on track to secure the support of Florida voters.  The Alaska constitu-
tional provisions for merit selection are also under attack.192  An effort to intro-
duce a merit selection scheme in Texas193 might have a chance of success as an
alternative to the election of trial judges in populous counties.194  It is also under
consideration in numerous other states.  While proposals to reform judicial ar-
ticles of state constitutions are under study in many states, those seeking to di-
minish the role of the electorate in controlling the membership of highest state
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courts face a steep uphill struggle.  While the aim to depoliticize courts may be
fully warranted with respect to courts and judges that are subject to appellate
review by higher courts, the people are rightly reluctant to confer on a profes-
sional elite the responsibility for deciding such questions as whether there is a
right to live or a right to die.  In some form, judicial elections are here to stay.
We cannot have it both ways:  If we are going to use courts to decide whether
there is a right to live or a right to die and to set the level of taxation for schools
or on cigarettes, then some accountability to the people is required.
V
PUBLIC CYNICISM AND THE MEDIA
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the wounds suffered by the state judi-
ciaries, like those in California, are often in some measure self-inflicted recur-
rences of long-standing issues.  But it would be wrong to place primary respon-
sibility for the present unrest with our judicial system on the judges of highest
state courts.  As noted at the outset, some of the causes of public mistrust lie
deep in the culture.  And there is another major external cause of the political
problem faced by our courts.
A powerful and unanswered argument has been made that a significant
cause of public cynicism is the current state of our journalism.195  The journal-
ism profession now maintains a reward system directed primarily at revealing
alleged misdeeds of public persons and to punish any of its members who speak
well of public persons.196  There are several identifiable causes of this phe-
nomenon.  One is Watergate; another is New York Times v. Sullivan,197 which
virtually eliminated defamation law as a disincentive to attacks on public fig-
ures by requiring them to prove malice; another is the advent of competition
from the gutter press sold in grocery stores and purveyed on the Internet.  For
all these reasons and perhaps others, journalists increasingly tend to exploit any
opportunity to infer and imply, for example, that a judge accepting a campaign
contribution is tailoring his or her decisions to reward supporters.198  Press cov-
erage of Congress, for example, has moved from skepticism to cynicism,199 and
political coverage generally has undergone a fundamental change in the distri-
bution of media coverage, from issue-based stories to ones that emphasize who
is ahead and behind and the strategies and tactics of campaigning necessary to
position a candidate to get ahead and stay ahead.200
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This genre of journalism has in recent years spread to provide coverage of
courts and lawyers.  The National Law Journal and The American Lawyer have
local counterparts in several cities.  A corps of reporters now cover the Su-
preme Court of the United States, providing a body of journalism unlike any
existing only a few decades ago.  Much of this reportage is, in Jamieson’s term,
“strategic,” that is, focussed on the unstated motives of lawyers and judges.
On top of and partly underlying all the previously noted causes is the tech-
nology of television.  Twenty-four hour newscasts are insatiable in their need
for alarming and scandalous information about public matters, the courts in-
cluded.  Never mind the effect of Court TV and the penetration of cameras into
courtrooms, where we are afforded the unedifying experience of watching our
sausages being made.  The O. J. Simpson trial, whatever else it may have been,
was only the most dramatic of the unsuccessful public relations ventures of
state courts.
Moreover, television reinforces not only the more destructive impulses of
journalists, but also facilitates the mutual destruction of politicians, including
judges.  As Rose Bird’s career was among the first to reveal, media campaign-
ing has greatly magnified the demerits of judicial elections.  The threat of a
media blitzkrieg is now a weapon of nuclear dimension.  This is so because of
the effectiveness of “negative campaigns” conducted with spot advertisements
on commercial television.  While a blitz of attack ads does not assure victory
and can backfire, the availability of the nuclear weapon has transformed our
public life.
The technology of the media blitz has been developed to a high level by
paid media consultants.  Indeed, a whole art form (or is it merely a business?)
has taken shape around the purpose of ridiculing, mischaracterizing, belittling,
and disflattering with photography political adversaries with a one minute (or
less) electronic exhibition resembling the evening news that can be inserted be-
tween innings or between conversations in a soap opera when the viewer is cap-
tive and uncritically attentive.  When well done by professionals, accompanied
with appropriate music, such art penetrates our uninterest, leaving a deposit of
disinformation.  Social psychologists explain the phenomenon as a melt-
down.201  Unwittingly, we assimilate the negative information insinuated by the
spot ads much as if it had been given to us by Walter Cronkite or Jim Lehrer.
This process of assimilation can be impeded if at all only by means of a prompt
and vigorous response employing the same technology.202  Promptness requires
a measure of anticipation, but if an attack can be anticipated and the intended
victim is adequately funded, then the attack ad may be turned against the as-
sailant.203  These conditions were present in Georgia and Tennessee in the
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summer of 1998 in sufficient measure to turn back efforts in those states to un-
seat high court judges by means of the media blitz.  But those conditions will
often be lacking, especially perhaps in judicial campaigns.
To harm, indeed to devastate, a candidacy by post-modern methods of
campaigning, it is not always necessary to make a substantive accusation; it may
be enough to transmit repeatedly an unflattering image of the target.204 A
seemingly effective device in common use in North Carolina in recent years has
been the malicious use of the movie camera:  A candidate is filmed at length,
until an unattractive expression crosses his or her face, the film is frozen on that
frame, which is then broadcast every few minutes on the most-watched chan-
nels.  Given post-modern technologies for altering images, motion picture film
is not needed:  The sneer or sappy look can now readily be superimposed on
the face of the target candidate.  Or an insignificant fact may be made to seem
significant by frequent repetition; thus, a news flash that a congressional candi-
date had, as a state legislator, once voted for a tax increase, was made into the
central issue in a 1997 election on Staten Island by means of relentless repeti-
tion on Manhattan television, achieved at great cost to the Republican National
Committee.205  Or a candidate’s misdeed may be trumpeted without disclosure
of the fact that it was committed by the candidate decades ago when adoles-
cent.  We have recently learned, for example, that a distinguished Congressman
had an illicit liaison thirty years ago.  A well-funded political adversary can ef-
fectively use this datum to put in his constituents’ minds the perception that the
Congressman has a continuing relationship with a woman of the evening.
This technology is likely the major factor in the degradation of our politics.
If members of Congress must devote much of their time to fundraising, the
public is not wrong to sense that “special interests” are in control of democratic
politics.206  And the journalists are not entirely wrong to think that members of
Congress are primarily engaged in that line of work.
This technology continues to improve.  The techniques for using “focus
groups” to test the effects of the dramatic presentations are improving daily.
So are the techniques for polling; for sufficient compensation, pollsters can now
persuade and dissuade voters by asking them questions proceeding from false
premises that must be assumed in order to frame a response.207  Best or worst of
all, it is now feasible, although costly, to target audiences with amazing speci-
ficity.  A candidate with enough money can put his or her message on the
fences of Yankee Stadium or Chavez Ravine as they appear on the television
screens of voters watching ball games in a particular electoral district anywhere,
messages that are quite invisible to those in the ball parks or watching the game
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on sets outside the target area.208  All of these improvements are, of course,
most useful as instruments of a style of campaigning that some voters might
reasonably regard as fraudulent.
For judicial campaigns, as the Bird experience suggests, criminal law and
capital punishment tend to be the winning issues.  In 1992, Justice James Rob-
ertson was driven off the Mississippi Supreme Court by a campaign directed
against one of his opinions expressing the view that the federal Constitution
prohibits capital punishment for rape where there was no loss of life.209  In such
a campaign, for a price Mississippi voters can be provided with the likeness of
the Mississippi rapist in the background of ball games played in Los Angeles,
suitably portrayed to reveal the rapist’s malevolent personality; and the like-
ness of his victim, suitably presented with exposed private parts to dramatize
the horror of his offense; and even the likeness of the judge, suitably portrayed
to confirm his callous disregard of her suffering.  All supported by a profes-
sional voice who sounds like the evening news, punctuated with the appropriate
music by Beethoven or Wagner.
The sort of attack mounted against Rose Bird’s retention has now been
mounted against judges in numerous states.  A successful attack in 1996 on Jus-
tice Penny White of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is especially notable.  It
centered on one opinion of the court in which she joined; the court set aside a
death sentence imposed on a notorious murderer on the ground that the con-
vict had a right to put on mitigation evidence at the sentencing hearing.210  The
campaign for a “No” vote against her was funded by the Tennessee Conserva-
tive Union and the Republican Party of Tennessee, neither of which has an in-
stitutional commitment to capital punishment, but both of whom generally dis-
approved of Justice White’s politics and shared a hope of controlling the
reapportionment process in Tennessee.  A similar campaign was mounted in
1998 against Justice White’s remaining Democratic colleagues.211  One resigned,
and the other, Alfonso Birch, narrowly survived.212
Republican Governor Don Sundquist explained his position by expressing
the hope that judges “will look over their shoulders [when making decisions] to
see if they’re going to be thrown out of office.”213  No doubt other members of
the Tennessee court, and of other courts, will in the future, as the Governor
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hoped, examine their cases more closely for political risk.  But campaigns such
as his against the Democratic members of the Tennessee Supreme Court have
other effects.  All judges participating in the adjudication of criminal cases must
at times conclude that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient;
as trial judges, they must dismiss cases or set aside verdicts, and, as appellate
judges, they must cast votes favoring reversals of convictions or favoring sen-
tences less severe than the maximum permitted by law.  Many such votes can
be the material for an effective media campaign such as that waged against
Penny White, for they can be reduced to spot ads redolent of the familiar and
infamous Willie Horton ads used to defame Governor Dukakis in the 1988
presidential election.214
While the costly media blitz such as that employed by Governor Sundquist
and his political allies is transmogrifying our politics in races from the presiden-
tial elections down to most congressional or state-wide elections and some local
ones, its effect is acutely unwelcome in judicial elections.  Because judicial elec-
tions arouse relatively little interest, voters in such elections are especially vul-
nerable to high-tech media manipulation, and disinformation about judicial
candidates is especially likely to “melt down.” What is food for geese is also
food for ganders; few judges are invulnerable.  While criminal law and capital
punishment are the most useful issues today, one ought not discount the inge-
nuity of the new profession of media consultants to devise other means for de-
stroying a judicial career.  Judicial candidates cannot effectively respond to at-
tack ads with “positive” campaigns because of the necessary restraints on their
freedom to make promises with respect to the outcome of future cases.  A sit-
ting judge under attack is thus left to boast of the number of executions he or
she has approved, or as one Ohio Supreme Court justice did, of his judgment
preventing a hike in utility rates.215
Although the number of successful campaigns against the retention of a
judge is small,216 sitting judges may with increasing frequency be sitting ducks.
The retention election devised as part of the Missouri plan has become, as a re-
sult of the advent of the negative spot commercial, a potential nightmare; can-
didates for retention in high judicial office can be especially vulnerable to elec-
tronic attack because they cannot reciprocate in kind against an adversary.  But
the impulse to use the tactic pervades contested elections as well and loads the
election process in favor of candidates with the most money to spend in this
way.
Bad as these direct effects of media campaigns against judicial candidates
are, the secondary effects are worse.  First, the poison of relentless negativity,
while harmful enough in its effect on the other branches of government, is es-
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pecially grave for the judiciary.  A closely contested election degrades both ri-
val candidates so that whoever is elected is likely to be disesteemed and dis-
trusted by losing parties.  It is made to seem that we might do better to choose
our judges by lot, as we do our jurors.
Secondly, the media blitz exponentially increases the cost of campaigns.
While the level of expenditures on legislative and executive political campaigns
is troubling enough,217 high-priced judicial elections are a public disaster.  The
cost of such campaigns has been doubling almost every biennium218 so that judi-
cial candidates in several states are regularly spending millions, much of it on
spot advertising on commercial television prepared by highly paid craftsmen
skilled in the art of disparaging public persons.  Funds sufficient for such races
cannot be raised by small individual contributions but only by contributions of
sufficient size to confirm the widely shared suspicion that the donor expects
something in return.  Also, the time and effort expended by judges in fundrais-
ing can be a serious distraction from the work of the court that the judge is em-
ployed to perform.
As polling data confirm, such contributions might well appear to disqualify
the judge from sitting on cases in which any contributor has an interest.219  Over
sixty years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States held it to be a denial of
due process of law for judges to adjudicate matters in which they have a finan-
cial stake.220  Many legal issues are now resolved in highest state courts by
judges who, although they have no direct stake in the outcomes, have received
substantial campaign support from persons or groups having direct interests in
the issues they decide.  What is a litigant in such a case to think of the disinter-
est and open-mindedness of a court whose members were financed by his or
her adversaries?  In 1995, a plaintiff in a Texas medical malpractice case sought
to disqualify high court judges on the basis of a videotape widely presented to
the electorate by the Texas Medical Association in which the judges in question
appeared.  Justice Gammage recused himself; Justice Enoch did not.221  While
the due process cases can be distinguished because the compensation to the
judges is paid in advance and is not conditioned on the result in a particular
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case,222 these are formal distinctions unconvincing to those suffering adverse
judgments, nor do they even settle the consciences of those judges who re-
ceived the contributions.  Justice Gammage perceived that to be a sufficient
reason for his recusal; Justice Enoch took the motion as an occasion to deplore
political selection of judges.
I personally have no doubt that most judges can, most of the time, disregard
the sources of their campaign funds when the time comes to decide cases in-
volving the interests of their supporters or of those who supported their com-
petitors.  Moreover, most lawyers and litigants who contribute to campaign
funds are, in their own minds, not trying to bribe judges but want only to secure
a judiciary that is not hostile to their interests.  But it asks entirely too much of
citizens to expect them to believe that there is no connection between who wins
and who pays.  Texas judges rightly protest a disparaging publication entitled
“Payola Justice,”223 yet the appearance of corruption to which that publication
and others like it seek to call attention is difficult to erase when large sums are
raised and invested in judicial campaigns.
Finally, there is the secondary effect on the willingness of able persons to
seek judicial office.  If one must start by raising large sums of money from law-
yers and litigants who will be appearing in one’s court, and must reckon on be-
ing the object of scurrilous personal abuse in the media, and be obliged to par-
ticipate in a game of competitive defamation, many of those lawyers who ought
to be judges will disdain the office.
VI
PRESCRIPTIONS
Francis Lieber, as wise as any nineteenth century American observer, noted
with wonder that the ancients were wholly unable to produce an independent
judiciary and that we are unable fully to appreciate its value.224  Roger Traynor
observed some years ago that there is no unobjectionable way to decide who
shall judge or to judge those who do.225  We cannot hope for a perfect solution
to an enduring problem associated with the human condition, but it is clearly
time to rethink, in light of the advent of vicious and expensive electronic media,
our state constitutional provisions bearing on the selection and retention of
judges, especially those sitting on courts of last resort.  It is imperative that our
judges be rescued from the mounting moral and political disaster of multi-
million dollars campaigns featuring high-tech name-calling.
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A. Appointment of Judges
The obvious remedy for the malignancy of judicial elections is to stop
electing judges.  The best of the various unsatisfactory ways of selecting high
court judges is probably that prescribed in the Constitution of the United
States.  By involving both the executive and the legislature, the Founders as-
sured a dialogue among political leaders.  Those appointed by that method will
tend to reflect the political preferences of governors and legislators who have
been elected by the people, and by the political parties who selected them.
They are likely to be persons in the middle range of political opinions and are
therefore more to be trusted not to impose idiosyncratic, demagogic, or elitist
moral judgment on the community.  Moreover, citizens who disapprove the se-
lections know which elected politicians to blame for appointments they disap-
prove and can punish them if they stand for reelection.  Also, while political
appointees are likely to have acquired preferment by performing political
services, only a few here and there have bought their appointment in the me-
dieval manner by contributing money to the campaigns of governors and legis-
lators.  No politically appointed judge is likely to have to raise a large personal
campaign fund to secure judicial office.  While political confirmation can be
rough, the appointee need not expose himself or herself to the hazards of com-
petitive defamation.  While political appointment has these advantages, it is not
saleable in most states.  Given the present disdain of the people for virtually
everyone holding public office, it will be very difficult in most states to per-
suade them to confer any new authority on either the governor or the legisla-
ture, or any elite group, to control the membership of a high court exercising
substantial political power.
There is still talk among lawyers of merit selection.226  Meritocratic ap-
pointment of lower court judges has much to be said for it and may be saleable
to voters in some states, but such a method of selecting judges for high courts is
in most states an option that is not available for the reasons stated in the pre-
ceding paragraph.  Indeed, as noted, even the device of the retention election,
as part of a merit system, may no longer be politically viable with respect to
highest state courts and is now possibly, for reasons stated, the worst kind of
election to conduct for judges who have been sitting for long enough to acquire
a record that can be mischaracterized on major league outfield fences.
One method of securing public consent to the appointment of judges has
not been tried in the United States.  It is the Japanese method of requiring ap-
pointees to stand in a confirmation election to be held before they take office.
That method assures the public of a role, and reminds those appointed that
they serve all the people as well as individual litigants, and can be conducted
without affording an opening for political intimidation of judges.  This device
                                                          
226. See, e.g., Samuel Latham Grimes, “Without Favor, Denial, or Delay”: Will North Carolina Fi-
nally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2266 (1998); Linda Strout, Selecting Judges:
Time for A Change?, KING COUNTY BAR ASS’N, Nov. 1998, at 2.
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might serve in some states to gain public support for political or “merit” ap-
pointments.
B. Disqualification Rules
A more saleable response hoping to limit the corrupting effects of expen-
sive media campaigns is a revision of provisions in ethical standards governing
the relation of judges to campaign contributors.  A state might require disclo-
sure of contributions to judicial campaigns and disqualify a judge from sitting
on a case in which any large contributor is a party or has a significant economic
stake in an issue coming before the court.227  A Task Force of the ABA has
made a recommendation along these lines, allowing lawyers to make limited
contributions without triggering a disqualification.228  The aim would be to
eliminate serious fundraising and thus force judicial candidates to return to the
humble practices of the past when low-cost campaigns featured handbills, post-
ers, and calling cards as the primary media of communication.
In addition to administrative difficulties and costs to parties associated with
the creation of an additional step in the litigation process when a judge is dis-
qualified, there is the problem with this approach that it does not readily reach
“issues advocates.”  Like squirrels finding the weak spot on the bird feeder,
persons interested in spending money to influence the selection of judges could
spend through organizations masking their identities and aims.  An example is
provided by the Tennessee Conservative Union that destroyed the judicial ca-
reer of Penny White.  If one is to believe all that one reads in the opinion of the
Court in Buckley v. Valeo,229 such organizations may have a constitutionally
protected right to spend without limit as long as they are not controlled by a
candidate.  They need only appear to take an interest in a substantive issue
such as capital punishment or public school finance, and perhaps refrain from
speaking too directly in opposition to a named candidate.230
Indeed, it appears possible that an organization such as the Tennessee Con-
servative Union cannot be made to reveal the sources of its funds.  It can claim
the same right to anonymity that the NAACP has enjoyed.231  And the Court
has recently pronounced the right of a citizen to pass handbills without putting
her name on them;232 arguably this decision extends to the right to conduct an
anonymous media blitz aimed at the destruction of the career of a sitting judge.
Such cases can be read to protect the right of personal injury lawyers or insur-
                                                          
227. See Banner, supra note 219; Grannis, supra note 219.  For further consideration of this ap-
proach, see AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, PART TWO, at 34-44 (1998); CITIZENS’ COMM. ON JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS, supra note 85 (Ohio report); MUNDY ET AL., supra note 218 (Pennsylvania report).
228. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 227, at 23-34.
229. 424 U.S. 1, 15, 21, 47 (1976).
230. See Michael D. Leffel, A More Sensible Approach to Regulating Independent Expenditures: De-
fending the Constitutionality of the FEC’s New Express Advocacy Standard, 95 MICH. L. REV. 686
(1996).
231. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
232. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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ance companies to band together for the purpose of conducting such an
anonymous blitz on sitting judges who have been resistant to their arguments
on the law of torts.  Such a blitz could say nothing about torts but could focus
on, say, public school finance and the unsightly sneer on the judge’s face. If
such a reading is correct, and such a group does have a right to mount such an
anonymous attack, then the imposition of disqualification rules is a bad idea
that will burden honest candidates and facilitate the efforts of those seeking to
subvert our courts with money.
Hopefully the Court may come to share the popular wisdom favoring dis-
closure,233 at least in circumstances involving the funding of a media blitz on a
defenseless judicial candidate.234  Without disclosure, any requirement of re-
cusal is futile.  One possible approach would be to allow anonymous contribu-
tions to interest advocacy organizations, such as the Tennessee Conservative
Union, by individuals who are not lawyers or litigants.  Such an exception
would, however, create an obvious and serious enforcement problem.
C. Regulating Campaign Tactics
As noted, most states have enacted codes of judicial conduct bearing on ju-
dicial campaigns.235  Many have modified those provisions in recent years, un-
der pressure from judicial candidates demanding the constitutional right to ex-
press their opinions on public issues.  The North Carolina court has recently
loosened its rule to allow political campaigning, but has adjured candidates to
abstain from the practice.236  These laws are, however, still sometimes effective.
For example, a candidate for the Supreme Court of Georgia was recently con-
strained from an unseemly attack on a sitting judge.237  But the restraints are
threatened by expansive views of the First Amendment.
This form of regulation is another that cannot be effectively applied to
“issue advocates” who are not under the direct control of the candidates.  For
example, in North Carolina, a group created for the purpose of engaging in ju-
dicial politics emerged for the 1986 general election.  Its funding sources are
not known.  They organized press conferences for the victims of criminals or
alleged criminals whose rights had been enforced by a candidate for Chief Jus-
tice.  Under the existing North Carolina law, the candidate, who was a sitting
member of the court, could not explain his decisions.  His adversary, the in-
                                                          
233. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 227, at 19-23.
234. See Malcolm A. Heinicke, A Political Reformer’s Guide to McIntyre and Source Disclosure
Laws for Political Advertising, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133 (1997).
235. See generally PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (1990).  See also Ellen Langill, Levi Hubbell and the Wisconsin Judi-
ciary: A Dilemma in Legal Ethics and Non-Partisan Judicial Elections, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 985 (1998).
236. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 90, at 3.
237. See Jonathan Ringel, Campaign Attack Tests New Rules, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June
19, 1998, at 1.
CARRINGTON.FMT 04/01/99  4:59 PM
Page 79: Summer 1998] HIGHEST STATE COURTS 117
cumbent Chief Justice, felt called upon to disown this scurrilous assault.238
Nevertheless, such advertising has become a feature of our judicial politics.239
D. Expenditure Limits
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently adopted a provision in its Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct limiting expenditures in judicial campaigns.240  A similar pro-
posal is being advanced in Pennsylvania.241  The Ohio law has been successfully
challenged in the United States Court of Appeals.242  The best argument for
limits on campaign expenditures is the effect of large sums on the conduct of
candidates; not only do large contributions sustain the relentlessly negative
campaigns for which spot advertising is so effective, but the need for large sums
requires judicial candidates, if through surrogates, to raise large sums for which
there will be a quid pro quo, imagined if not real.  However, while the Court of
Appeals decision may very well be erroneous, expenditure limits are subject to
the same objection as the disqualification rule in that they do not prevent inde-
pendent “issues advocates” from making judges dependent upon them.
It is also the case that spending limits, such as those promulgated in Ohio,
are unnecessarily inclusive.  There is very little harm to the integrity of the
courts caused by extravagant expenditures on handbills, billboards, mail, and
newspaper advertising.  All these forms of campaigning depend on the written
word and do not rely on artificial means of capturing the attention of readers.
They are not musically scored, and artistic flourishes have scant consequence.
Even advertising on television is not especially objectionable so long as the
communication is being presented to an audience that is tuned in for the pur-
pose of acquiring information for use in voting, as in a debate.  It is the profes-
sionally crafted spot ad on commercial television that so degrades our politics
and our institutions.
To make spending limits effective to constrain the abuse of commercial
television, it would be necessary to restrain issues advocates.  Otherwise, large
contributors to judicial campaigns will find a way of satisfying their desires to
corrupt the process by passing their money through an anonymously funded
organization.  Absolute restraints on issues advocates almost certainly cannot
be sustained, given the Supreme Court’s extensions of the First Amendment.  If
“issues advocates” advance or oppose a particular individual candidacy, it is
possible that they may be constrained.  The Court might allow a state to create
                                                          
238. See Grimes, supra note 226, at 2288-93.
239. See James C. Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE
STATES 19, 28 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
240. See OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(c)(6) (1998).
241. See Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Commission
Announces Recommendations to Reform Judicial Campaigns (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/pub/commleg/prrel416.html>.  The report of the Pennsylvania Special
Commission to Limit Campaign Expenditures was issued in February.
242. See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142
F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998).
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a campaign period in which only the competing candidates using their own
campaign funds would be permitted to use commercial television in opposition
to one another.  If issue advocates could be so constrained for six or eight
weeks immediately before election day, then expenditure limits might be wor-
thy of serious attention as a response to the crisis of politically generated mis-
trust.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court might in the not too distant future modify its
holding in Buckley and take a more charitable view of spending limits, at least
in judicial campaigns.  For this to happen, someone would have to develop a
persuasive Brandeis brief informing the Court of the realities of campaign
spending and fundraising.  The Court would have to be persuaded of what I
here suggest, that the practice of spending large sums of money on a political
campaign is inextricably associated with the appearance of corruption, and the
reality of defamation and fraud, that degrades the courts.  Again, the grave
problem of spot advertising on commercial television is that it “melts down” to
influence an unwilling audience who are not on guard against disinformation.
Hopefully, when the Court next considers these issues, it will be better in-
formed about the gravity of that problem.  It might even be demonstrable that,
as more money is available to screen more spot ads crafted by professional me-
dia consultants and to deploy more “push pollsters,” the less respect our judi-
cial institutions can command, and the less likely are qualified candidates to
seek judicial office.  It might also be demonstrable that the activities of judges
in raising large sums is equally degrading.  As Judge Avern Cohn aptly noted in
a recent concurring opinion, Buckley rests on dubious factual assumptions
made by the Court and not effectively challenged in subsequent cases.243
E. Extending Term Limits
A more saleable and clearly constitutional, albeit imperfect, reform would
be to extend the terms of most state court judges.  The reader may have noted
that my remarks favoring the federal method of selecting judges said nothing
about the terms of their appointment.  As noted, no state and no foreign coun-
try has opted for life tenure for judges having the power of judicial review of
legislation.  Everyone who has considered the question as an open one has cho-
sen term or age limits.  Frederick Grimke, who thought about these issues as
deeply as anyone in antebellum times and favored the election of judges, rec-
ommended that judicial terms should be no longer than necessary to induce
good lawyers to give up their practices to seek the office.244  New York gives its
high court judges fourteen-year terms.245  The District of Columbia’s judges
serve fifteen-year terms.246  Twelve-year terms are not uncommon for lower
court judges in many states.
                                                          
243. See Kruse, 142 F.3d at 924.
244. See GRIMKE, supra note 66, at 457.
245. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
246. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1502 (1981).
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Six- and eight-year terms for highest courts are more common.  The longer
terms for high court judges have several virtues.  One is that they reduce the
real cost of campaigning by spreading that cost over more years.  Another is
that many, perhaps most, members of a court serving terms of such length will
not seek reelection.  Some European constitutions do not provide for reap-
pointment,247 and German law forbids it.248  Consideration should be given to
adopting that practice in the United States, for that would make sitting judges
less vulnerable to political attack.  The down-side of forbidding reappointment
or reelection is that it elevates the chances that a sitting judge will be influenced
by the need to secure employment after his or term is complete.  Even if
twelve-year judges are permitted to seek second terms, the prospect is pushed
far enough into the future term that it poses a meager threat for most of the pe-
riod of service.  The risk of political intimidation of a court is almost elimi-
nated.  Longer terms for highest state courts also stabilize the law of a state by
reducing turnover.  For these reasons, the minimum term for a high court
judge, however he or she is selected, should be at least ten years.
F. Reducing the Number of Electoral Rounds: Preferential Voting
A similar step to alleviate the problem of costly campaigning would be to
remove judicial elections from primary ballots.  This would almost halve the
cost of campaigning for many judicial candidates.  In addition, there might be
no run-offs.  These effects can be achieved by allowing voters to rank their
preferences among competing candidates.  A majority approval can then be
achieved by reassigning the votes of last place candidates to the second choice
of each voter.  Given the low level of voter interest in judicial elections,249 one
round of voting seems enough.
To emphasize the different character of judicial elections, the vote might be
taken on a separate ballot.  Perhaps that ballot might be distributed to voters
who cast votes in the general election, to be returned by mail, in the Oregon
manner,250 a week or so later.251  The defect in this idea is that it would magnify
the power of special interests able to turn out a vote in a low-visibility election.
                                                          
247. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 94 (F.R.G.).  See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 149-71 (1994).  For a compilation, see
European Commission for Democracy Through Law, in THE COMPOSITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS (1997).
248. See CURRIE, supra note 247, at 158-59.
249. See JACK LADINSKY & ALLAN SILVER, POPULAR DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL INDE-
PENDENCE: ELECTORATE AND ELITE REACTIONS TO TWO WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS
132 (1966), quoted in Croley, supra note 79, at 732 n.132.
250. See OR. REV. STAT. § 254-470 (1991).
251. To make this work, it would appear to be necessary to place a moratorium on other forms of
campaigning during that week, and perhaps for a few days before.  Such a constraint could be analo-
gized to the customary constraints on electioneering at the voting place.
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G. Public Funding: The Voter’s Guide
The key to any comprehensively effective solution to the problem of judi-
cial elections is to provide modest public funding.  Federal money is used in
presidential campaigns, albeit with no great success in constraining excessive
expenditures, the appearance of corruption, and abusive campaign practices.252
However, Maine and Vermont have recently enacted “Clean Election Laws”
establishing public funding of legislative and gubernatorial campaigns.253  And,
in 1998, voters in Arizona and Massachusetts approved public-funding refer-
enda.254  A 1996 Roper Poll found that almost two-thirds of the respondents fa-
vored full public financing of all political campaigns, while only one in four op-
posed it.255  The reason most people favor public funding is obvious, and so is
the chief reason for resistance to the idea.  People and organizations hoping to
control our politics, and our courts with their money oppose it.  Six out of seven
Americans believe that all our governments are controlled by the people and
organizations who fund election campaigns.256  Most despair of improvement;
by a margin of forty-six to thirty-one, they think it more likely they will see El-
vis than that they will see genuine campaign finance reform.257  It is almost cer-
tainly the fact, as many believe, that all the elections in America could be pub-
licly financed from the savings of public subsidies that no disinterested person
would favor and that exist only because those who are interested spend a lot of
money getting the right people elected.
As Roy Schotland has urged,258 partial public funding of judicial campaigns
might take the form practiced in many California counties259 of a publication of
a voter’s guide distributed at county expense.  In Los Angeles County at the
present time, judicial candidates must pay as much as $50,000 to place a 200-
word ballot statement in the County’s official voter’s guide.  States enacting a
Clean Courts Law could publish at public expense an official guide in which ju-
dicial candidates are allowed to present such a statement limited in length.
                                                          
252. See Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Representative Democracy versus Corporate Democracy: How
Soft Money Erodes the Principle of “One Person, One Vote”, 35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 377 (1998).
253. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (West 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §§ 2851-
2856 (1997); see Michael E. Campion, The Maine Clean Election Act: The Future of Campaign Finance
Reform, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2391 (1998).
254. See The Voice of the Voters, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 1998, at D6; Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Lis-
ten Up, Lawmakers: Voters Rule, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1998, at A9.
255. See 1996 Roper Center Public Opinion Online No. 0270818, Question 027, available in LEXIS,
Market Library, Roper File.
256. See 1997 Roper Center Public Opinion Online No. 0269927, Question 001, available in LEXIS,
Market Library, Roper File.
257. See id. at No. 0276120, Question 011.  Legislators seem to take comfort in the fact that cam-
paign finance reform never ranks high on the list of laws people want enacted; a review of scores of
Roper polls on the matter suggests to me that the reason poll respondents are not excited about such
reform is that they are convinced that it will not be done in an effective way.  The cynicism level on
this issue is off the charts.
258. See Schotland, supra note 81, at 127-28.
259. See Joseph Cerrell & Hal Dash, Issues in Judicial Election Campaigns, in STATE JUDICIARIES
AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES at 39, 47 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).
Other western states now also make general use of this device.
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Even given the number of registered voters to whom the guide would be
mailed, such a subsidy would not require a vast expenditure of public funds.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that public funding can be
conditioned on a candidate’s submission to reasonable constraints on receipts
from other sources.260  Thus, if such a guide were publicly funded and distrib-
uted, it would be possible to exact from judicial candidates accepting the oppor-
tunity to make a statement in the guide some commitments regarding their
election conduct.  A state might, for example, require instantaneous reporting
by Internet on contributions received by the candidate and that funds be re-
ceived before they are expended, with a final report on receipts and expendi-
tures set forth in the guide.  In the alternative, it might require that all contribu-
tions be received anonymously through a blind bank account.261  It might
require candidates participating in the voter pamphlet to forgo borrowing and
to abstain from payments to political parties or to interest groups to subsidize
the distribution of “slate mailers” identifying a list of candidates approved by
an organization.262  It might require participating candidates to turn over to the
public fisc any funds received as campaign contributions and not expended in
the campaign.  Possibly, it might also require participating candidates to agree
to the ethical standards traditionally imposed on judicial campaigns and to limi-
tations on the contributed funds they could expend.  It might, for example, re-
quire participating candidates to forgo negative television advertising.  Candi-
dates not performing the required conditions would still be listed on the ballot
and in the voter pamphlet, but they would not be permitted to make their per-
sonal statement in the pamphlet.
The official guide could also include information gathered by a Judicial
Evaluation Commission, such as that created in Tennessee in 1994.  That
Commission is responsible for polling fellow judges, lawyers, and court person-
nel, and reports judge’s performance evaluations, along with a brief record of
their legal education, professional experience, and service to the profession.263
The report is published by the state of Tennessee but is not distributed to every
voter.  It includes statements by the candidates, which for the most part are de-
scriptions of their community service.
The Tennessee report stops short of providing political information of the
sort that a voter might reasonably want to have in choosing a judge for a high-
est state court.  For a reasonable fee deferring part of the cost of the guide, po-
litical parties and other established interest groups could also be allowed to
publish in it, but their statements would be limited to a very brief account of
                                                          
260. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976).
261. I am indebted to Ian Ayres for this suggestion.
262. Slate mailers may be most highly developed in California, where interest groups, like political
parties, are known to charge the cost and more to candidates whom they endorse.  See Schotland, su-
pra note 81, at 69-72.
263. See, e.g., TENNESSEE JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMMISSION, TENNESSEE APPELLATE JUDGES
EVALUATION REPORT (1998).  See generally Susan Keilitz & Judith W. McBride, Judicial Perform-
ance Evaluation Comes of Age, STATE CT. J., Winter 1992, at 4.
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the nature of the organization and a listing of a slate of endorsed candidates.
Candidates could seek effective endorsements from influential groups by any
means other than paying for them.  Political parties and participating interest
groups would, like the candidates, also have to submit to reasonable constraints
on other campaign activities in order to have their slate identified in the guide.
They might be required to forgo “spot” advertisements on commercial televi-
sion in judicial campaigning and to make financial disclosures just as candidates
must.
The Supreme Court has never considered a campaign finance case involving
a judicial election.  It has acknowledged the legitimate public interest in avoid-
ing the appearance of corruption, and it seems likely that the Court would rec-
ognize that interest as especially acute in the context of judicial campaign fi-
nance.  Accordingly, I am cautiously optimistic that the Court would uphold a
Clean Courts Law providing for a controlled voter’s guide such as I have pro-
posed.
Some states may be unable or unwilling to appropriate any funds for such a
Clean Courts Law.  Perhaps some or all of the money needed could be raised
by a tax on the state’s license to practice law.  Given that the scheme would
serve to relieve the pressure on lawyers to contribute to judicial campaigns, this
could be a bargain for many lawyers.  And all lawyers would receive the moral
benefit of being known as officers of clean courts.
Public funding such as that proposed here would place greater pressure on
the integrity of the commission or agency responsible for the administration of
judicial elections.  Groups willing to spend millions on the media may also be
willing to spend millions to influence the commission to put a thumb on the
scales.  Acknowledging that risk, I again concede that no system is perfect.  It
would seem that the risk of some skullduggery in the commission is a hazard
much smaller than those we now face.
H. Blitz Insurance
In addition, as part of a scheme of modest funding, the state might follow
Maine’s lead by providing candidates operating within its rules with media blitz
insurance.264  Such a scheme would authorize the use of public funds by the Ju-
dicial Election Commission to neutralize the effect of negative advertising on
commercial television against an announced candidate for judicial office by
anyone other than a rival candidate who takes personal responsibility for the
contents of the ad.  It would be the duty of the Commission to release funds to
a candidate who was the object of an electronic attack by “issues advocates”;
the distribution to be equal to the amount expended in the attack.  The hope
would be that the availability of such funds would further chill the desire of is-
sues advocates to employ personal attack advertising on commercial television
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in judicial campaigns.  If successfully prophylactic, this device would also cost
very little.
There is an imaginable hazard that a judicial candidate might enlist an
anonymous issue advocate to make an attack in order to secure the blitz insur-
ance.  This hazard could be reduced to manageable size if the Commission can
be relied upon not to overreact.  Also, because it would chill the speech of issue
advocates, it might encounter First Amendment difficulty.  Perhaps that might
be avoided by limiting the insurance to a sixty- or ninety-day period immedi-
ately preceding election day.
I. Reviving Tort Law
Also worthy of consideration would be legislation to restore the law of torts
as an inhibition on election practices having adverse effects on the integrity of
the judicial system.  Such a law might deal forthrightly and specifically with the
most urgent problem of expensive, insidious, derogatory spot campaign adver-
tisements inserted into commercially programmed television.  It would, how-
ever, encounter the other horn of the constitutional dilemma created by the
Supreme Court’s modern enlargements of the First Amendment.
A law restoring the principles of defamation law to our judicial politics
would need to be crafted as narrowly as possible to constrain only the most de-
structive forms of defamation.  It could be made inapplicable to traditional
forms of campaigning, including handbills, public speeches, even televised de-
bates, and perhaps not even to radio advertising, noncommercial cable televi-
sion, or the Internet, all of which are inexpensive and lack the insidious power
of the advertisement spotted during a time-out or between innings when the
viewer is off guard.  The law would be supported by legislative findings that
such ads spotted in commercial programs “melt down” in the manner described
by Dean Jamieson.265  It would express a presumption that any utterance or de-
piction (1) contained in a paid spot on commercial television, (2) regarding an
identifiable, announced candidate for judicial office within, say, ninety days of
the election, and (3) presented without the candidate’s permission, is disinfor-
mative and a fraud on the right of the people to participate in an honest elec-
tion unless the person or organization responsible for the utterance provides
the candidate with equal time in which to reply.  The new law would apply not
merely to rival candidates, but also to issue advocates such as the Tennessee
Conservative Union who are engaged in “express advocacy” by naming or oth-
erwise identifying a candidate as their target.
Such a Fraudulent Disparagement Law might be enforced by a Judicial
Election Commission by injunction and by an action for damages.  The dam-
ages might be measured by the amount spent on the offending advertisements,
and the proceeds would be used by the Commission to counteract their effects.
A Fraudulent Disparagement Law would cost little public money and might be
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effective to discourage issue advocacy organizations from spending on reten-
tion elections as a means of gaining control of a court.
In the alternative, enforcement might be put in the hands of an aggrieved
and unsuccessful candidate.  Such a plaintiff might be afforded a right to de-
mand a jury trial on the truth of a political ad on commercial television.  A ver-
dict that such an ad was false or seriously misleading would result in the elec-
tion being cancelled and the winning judge being unseated, unless the victor
could show that he or she had no responsibility for the ad and made a timely
disavowal of it.  Such a law would take a lot of the fun out of attack ads.
Obviously, such proposals encounter constitutional difficulty with the doc-
trine of New York Times v. Sullivan266 protecting utterances against public fig-
ures from liability in the absence of proof of malice.  The right of citizens to de-
fame public officials is now so widely recognized that it has become ingrained
in our legal culture.267  That said, I can express my agreement with Justice By-
ron White that his vote in Sullivan was the most serious mistake of his thirty-
year career.268  Of course, the Court could not have allowed Alabama in that
case to suppress the New York Times by means of a large punitive damages
award, but its opinion went far beyond the requirements of the case and has
had grave effects on the quality of our public discourse.
There is reason to hope that Sullivan can be successfully distinguished on
four grounds.  First, print media lack the insidious effect of the high-tech spot
television advertisement inserted in commercial programming that attracts
audiences who are not on guard against political deceit.  Second, printed defa-
mations, which are read only by those whose interest is sufficient to cause them
to read the material, are not only much less effective, but can be rebutted at far
less expense.  Third, Sullivan and its progeny were decided outside the realm of
political campaigns in which the time for reply to derogatory utterances and
depictions is defined by an election date.  Finally, Sullivan did not involve an
effort to protect the public from fraud and conserve the public trust in judicial
institutions, a factor meriting some consideration in weighing First Amendment
imperatives, given that the underlying sovereign aim of the First Amendment is
to protect the channels of political discourse.  For these reasons, it is imagin-
able that the Court would uphold a statute narrowly drawn to discourage the
use of attack advertisements spotted on commercial television during judicial
campaigns.
                                                          
266. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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J. A Role for the Organized Bar
As a weaker alternative to the proposals just stated, an organized bar can
deploy its moral and financial resources to conduct a similar program.
Minnesota is a state in which moral sanctions are now employed to control
harmful election practices.269  Candidates who do not sign and perform a clean
election pledge are treated as pariahs.  I suspect that moral restraints are still
operative in many other states with respect to judicial elections; that is, candi-
dates would be shamed if they spent vast sums to secure judicial office and used
negative spots in a campaign; judicial candidates are widely importuned by bar
groups to behave.  A well-organized state bar can strengthen this effect, exact-
ing pledges from candidates for judicial office and advertising against those
who fail to sign or who dishonor their pledges.  Indeed, some bar organizations
have initiated such programs and backed them up with funds gathered from
members of the bar.270
A state bar could also establish a program of modest subvention of judicial
elections comparable to that proposed above.  It could provide a semi-official
brochure available to candidates and organizations willing to play by its rea-
sonable rules.  It could imaginably finance a program of negative advertising
insurance with a modest dues increase that would attract candidates into its
scheme of semi-official regulation of electoral conduct and correspondingly
forbid lawyers to contribute to judicial campaigns or to “issue advocacy” or-
ganizations spending on such campaigns.  It could also spend funds so acquired
to deter such organizations operating outside the campaigns of judicial candi-
dates.
Or, in the alternative, a state bar might provide substantial funds to a Rapid
Response Campaign Oversight Committee to enable such a group to react
strongly and in kind to foul practices.  Such a committee might be able to nego-
tiate retractions in some situations.  There is an obvious risk that such a com-
mittee, if improperly motivated, could abuse its role.  And the prospect that
many state bars could pursue a broadly effective program of this sort may be
remote at the present time.  On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a more
appropriate object of concern for the bar than the integrity of its judicial sys-
tem.
VII
CONCLUSION
While the foregoing is not quite a complete review of every idea ever pro-
posed for handling political campaigns for highest state courts,271 it covers all
that I could find in the literature that seem to me worthy of consideration by
                                                          
269. The Minnesota Compact is described in CAPPELLA & JAMIESON, supra note 195, at 244-46,
275-79.
270. See Schotland, supra note 81, at 96-107.
271. See id. at 121-32.
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state legislatures or bar associations at this time as responses to the crisis of in-
tegrity in their courts.  None of them is perfect, but almost any of them would
be an improvement on a system entailing privately financed, multi-million dol-
lar campaigns for high judicial office.
However highest state court judges are selected, and whatever the terms of
their employment, the outcome will reflect the condition of the social and po-
litical order from which they come.  It will also depend on a measure of luck.  It
is a comfort to reflect that our Republic has over two hundred years enjoyed
sufficient luck in these matters to suggest the intervention of Providence, even
if, alas, not all our judges are the sorts of persons we might hope with President
Taft to meet in Heaven.
